



SEPTEMBER 22, 2003 \$3.95





Everyone wins when you buy a new home. The boys get a game room. Little sister gets a big back yard. Big sister gets her own bathroom. And it doesn't stop there. The lender can sell the mortgage to Freddie Mac and use the funds to finance another home. We, in


turn, can package it with others to sell to investors, who can count on the repayment of the loan from Mom and Dad. That's why there's always plenty of low-cost mortgage money to go around. And that helps create a nation of homeowners. For details, visit FreddieMac.com.



©2003 Freddie Mac www.FreddieMac.com

The Case for a Dynamic Economy

David R. Henderson is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.



Here are the facts. In July of this year, 14.6 million Americans were employed in manufacturing. This is a 17 percent decline from the peak of 17.6 million in March 1998. But over that same period, manufacturing output actually grew slightly, even with a recession in between. How could that be? Simple. Productivity in manufacturing—output per worker—grew substantially. In other words, we are making more goods with fewer workers.

Isn't manufacturing falling as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)? Yes. And, as my Hoover colleague Robert Hall pointed out in recent congressional testimony, it has been falling fairly steadily since 1947. The reason is that the tremendous productivity growth in manufacturing has caused prices of manufactured goods to fall relative to prices of health care, education, and other services. So even though manufacturing output has risen, GDP accounts value this output at market prices, which have been falling. You are not worse off because you can buy two televisions for the same amount (inflation adjusted), that you would have paid for one lower-quality television twenty years ago. You are better off. In fact, the declining prices of manufactured goods are one of the main reasons per capita income and wealth have grown so much since World War II.

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

One consequence of increased productivity, of course, is loss of manufacturing jobs. That is a hardship for workers who were previously employed in manufacturing. But they find work elsewhere. In other words, they produce other goods or services that help increase our standard of living. The only way to prevent the loss of manufacturing jobs is to impose draconian restrictions that bind workers to manufacturing and make productivity growth illegal. Besides reducing our freedom, such restrictions would also freeze our standard of living. The history of economic growth is the history of people making more with less and shifting into new jobs that were unheard of in the previous generation. Because Henry Ford produced millions of cars on assembly lines, workers producing buggies lost their jobs. And, ten years later, most of them were probably glad they did.

Of course, some of the job loss is due to the fact that we buy goods from China and other low-wage countries. But that is just another way of saying that we have better uses for our labor here. If you take your clothes to a dry cleaner, you "lose the job" of cleaning your clothes at home. And you'll take that loss every day—the time you free up is better used in leisure activities or in working more. Similarly, we are better off buying mass-produced, low-wage goods from China and producing high-end services and intellectual property here in the United States.

The decline in manufacturing jobs, whether due to higher productivity or freer trade, is a boon to Americans.

— David R. Henderson



Visit us on-line at www.hoover.org or contact us to receive a complimentary copy of the 200-page, award-winning Hoover Digest.

Hoover Institution...ideas defining a free society

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Stanford California 94305-6010
Toll-free: 877.466.8374 Fax: 650.723.1687
info@hoover.stanford.edu www.hoover.org

YOU'RE LOOKING AT THE MOST POWERFUL ECONOMIC FORCE IN THE COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN DREAM.




The population is growing and with it the American Dream of homeownership. In fact, every eight seconds a baby is born in this country — that's four million babies a year. This combined with the millions of families that move to our country in pursuit of the American Dream makes for a population that we anticipate will grow by 30 million by 2010. And when they dream of owning a home, we'll be there. Because as the American Dream grows, so do we.





2	Scrapbook "The Other 9/11," Howard Dean, and more.	5	Correspondence
4	Casual Richard Starr, big eater.	9	Editorial Exit Arafat?
Aı	rticles		
10	Two, Three, Many Seats Republicans have high hopes	for Se	nate pickups in 2004
12	End of the Road Map And the beginning of a new	Israel	strategy
14	Not Defending the Defensible Justice's civil liberties red	cord is	better than it lets on BY THOMAS F. POWERS
16	Now You See It, Now You Don't Resorting to magic	cal thi	nking about defense obligations BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN
18	Mr. Keynes Goes to Washington The economic conse	equenc	es of the war
19	Unfair and Unbalanced Why the media did a lousy job co	vering	the intifada BY JOSHUA MURAVCHIK
21	China's Imperial Dream The strategic importance of To	aiwan	BY HISAHIKO OKAZAKI



Cover: Randy Lyhus

Features

23 Against United Europe

26 Premature Iraqification

Why creating Iraqi government and security can't be done overnight BY REUEL MARC GERECHT

Books & Arts

31	Forty-Four Years of Solitude Cuba under Castro
32	Novel Gods A pair of bestsellers roll their own religion
34	Out of Kees The strange life and death of the American poet Weldon Kees
35	Sufi Surfing Pico Iyer and the Californization of mystical Islam BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ
38	THE STANDARD READER
40	Not a Parody

William Kristol, Editor Fred Barnes, Executive Editor

David Tell, Opinion Editor Christopher Caldwell, Senior Editor Richard Starr, Claudia Winkler, Managing Editors
J. Bottum, Books & Arts Editor Matt Labash, Senior Writer
Victorino Matus, David Skinner, Assistant Managing Editors
Victorino Matus, Continetti, Rachel DiCarlo, Erin Montgomery, Editorial Assistants

Lev Nisnevitch, Art Director Philip Chalk, Production Director

Max Boot, Tucker Carlson, John J. DiIulio Jr., Noemie Emery, Joseph Epstein, Andrew Ferguson, David Frum, David Gelernter, Reuel Marc Gerecht Brit Hume, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Tod Lindberg, P. J. O'Rourke, John Podhoretz, Irwin M. Stelzer, Contributing Editors

Terry Eastland, Publisher Peter Dunn, Advertising Director
Nicholas H.B. Swezey, Advertising & Marketing Manager Lauren Trotta Husted, Circulation Director
Tina Winston, Finance Director Catherine Titus Lowe, Publicity Director

The Weekly Standard (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the first week in January, the second week in July, the third week in August, and the first week in September) by News America
Standard

The Weekly Standard (1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to The Weekly Standard,
20 Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-227-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-238-2014. Subscribers:
20 Box 96127, Washington, DC 20096-6153; changes of address to The Weekly Standard,
20 Control of the Weekly Standard,
20 Control of the Weekly Standard,
20 Control of the Weekly Standard,
20 Send and the first week in September) by News America
Standard of the Weekly Standard,
20 Box 96127, Washington, DC 2007-7767. For subscription customer service,
20 Control of the Weekly Standard,
20 Send address of the Wee

Taybor Cook, Carolyn Wimmer, Executive Assistants

The Other 9/11, cont.

When THE SCRAPBOOK reported last week on various commemorations of the "other" September 11 attack—the coup that toppled Chilean president Salvadore Allende's government in 1973—we thought we were simply publicizing the activities of a few far-left performance artists. Silly us. It turns out that no less an authority than the *New York Times*'s editorial board was among those *über*-blue-state Americans who spent last Thursday commemorating the "other" 9/11.

In what we suppose was a shameless pander to the page's left-liberal base, last Thursday's *Times* included an editorial titled—you guessed it—"The Other Sept. 11." The editorial draws turgid parallels between Pinochet's military coup and al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. "Death came from the skies" in both attacks, you see. "A symbol of the nation" was destroyed on both infa-

mous days. (For those of you who aren't Chilean nationalists, the building in question 30 years ago was "La Mone-



da," the Chilean presidential palace.)

What's more, the September 11, 1973, attacks "would lead to the deaths of 3,000 people," too. The moral of the story is that even though "the United States did not directly participate in the coup," as the *Times* admits, "our nation's hands have not always been clean."

As an exercise in creepy left-wing America-bashing, the *Times* editorial ranks way up there. It may be surpassed by the Broken Tooth Puppet Troupe's production of "The Other 9/11: Another Hemisphere Remembers (& Other Tales)," but we couldn't bring ourselves to carry out due diligence on the puppets.

Meanwhile, not to be outdone, the flagship of America-hating newspapers, *Le Monde*, that same day published the grotesque cartoon you see to the left, making the same point. Fine company the *Times* is keeping.

Pricking the Dean Bubble

It's happening. The Democratic presidential primary campaign has finally been joined in earnest. By which The Scrapbook means: The other candidates have finally decided that they've just about had it up to here with this Howard Dean character and his amateur Internet brigade and his starryeyed press corps groupies and ... well, it's time for the grown-up pros to cut Dean's legs off so the grown-up pros can get on with their grown-up pro business, isn't it?

Did you know, Joe Lieberman asks America in a nationally televised debate last Tuesday, that Howard Dean recently said Palestinian terrorism is not reason enough for U.S. Middle East diplomacy to tilt toward Israel in sympathy? "Nobody should have violence, ever," Dean told a campaign audience in New Mexico the week before. "But they do, and it's not our place to take sides." Dean's comments, Lieberman advises, risk breaking one of our "most critical alliances."

John Kerry agrees with Lieberman about this: "Either [Dean] doesn't know that we took sides long ago or he's changing American policy in a major way." Kerry also doesn't think too highly of Dean's position on gun control: "I've never been endorsed by the NRA," he sniffs. Nor does Kerry approve of Dean's economic proposals: "If you're a \$40,000 income earner, Howard Dean's going to raise your taxes more than 20 times."

Oh—almost forgot, back on the Middle East again: You know that damagecontrol interview Dean gave Wolf Blitzer on CNN last week, the one where he implied that he thought Israel was justified in targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, 'cause after all, if Hamas "soldiers" are going to make war on the Jews, then Hamas "soldiers" must expect to get killed in retaliation? Well, Kerry thinks that's pretty darn disgusting, too. "In going out of his way to term members of Hamas as 'soldiers,' Governor Dean insults the memory of every innocent man, woman, and child killed by these suicidal murderers. Hamas militants are not soldiers in a war-they are terrorists who need to be stopped."

Hear, hear! Anybody looking forward to that New York primary?

Scrapbook



And this just in: Not to be outdone in bare-knuckle combat, Dick Gephardt has delivered a major speech (and released a brutal set of opposition-research fact sheets) designed to alert union members, retired people, and just-plain-folks Americans across the continent to the fact that Howard Dean, "as chairman of the National Governors' Association" in the mid-1990s, "agreed with the Gingrich Republicans" about Social Security and Medicare, which Dean called "one of the worst federal programs ever."

Dean pronounces himself "disappointed" in all these attacks. We bet "disappointed" isn't the half of it.

Warren Zevon, R.I.P.

ver the years, it has not been THE SCRAPBOOK's habit to memorialize deceased rockers. When the Bee Gee's Maurice Gibb succumbed to a bad ticker, we were conspicuously silent. When rapper Biggie Smalls went out in a hail of gunfire, we were the dog that didn't bark. But for Warren Zevon, who died September 7 at the age of 56, an exception is in order.

Of all the English-major huggybears from the golden era of the singer/songwriter in the 1970s, Zevon wrote the smartest, slyest, most biting lyrics. A genuine rockstar for about five minutes in 1978, when he charted with "Werewolves of London," Zevon was more of a struggling everyman, albeit a very clever one who always smiled through the pain, and never lapsed into unbecoming self-pity.

The son of a professional gambler who won Zevon his first car in a card game, Zevon was a noirish spirit to the point that he once house-hunted in Santa Barbara simply because Ross Macdonald lived there. Through the years, he turned personal failures into lyrical gems. After a two-decade-long drinking binge, he emerged sober with "Detox Mansion": Well I'm gone to Detox Mansion / Way down on Last Breath Farm / I've been rakin' leaves with Liza / Me and Liz clean up the yard.

But many of his best songs had nothing to do with his own tortured shortcomings. To this day, his 1987 paean to former lightweight boxing champion Boom Boom Mancini (Zevon's father had been a boxer) makes us smile: Hurry home early—hurry on home | Boom Boom Mancini's fighting Bobby Chacon. To our knowledge, it is the only lyric in the history of song to make use of the death of Du Koo Kim.

Then there is the funniest Cold War intrigue song ever, "Lawyers, Guns and Money," which opened: Well I went home with a waitress / The way I always do. / How was I to know / She was with the Russians, too?

Diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer, Zevon had the opportunity to plan his exit, and he made the most of it. He set about bravely saying his goodbyes, and his trademark dark humor never failed him. Given a full hour of broadcast time last fall by one of his biggest fans, David Letterman, he explained his illness to the audience, "First of all, let me say that I might have made a tactical error in not going to a physician for 20 years. It was one of those phobias that didn't really pay off."

Casual

GIRTH OF A NATION

he Department of Agriculture is now taking suggestions for its new, improved Food Pyramid, to unveiled in 2005. This is the federal government's pictograph of an ideal diet. The one now in use dates to 1992. Maybe you've seen it: The base shows six servings of the "Breads & Cereals Group." Moving up, you come to a row with three to five servings of vegetables and two to four servings of fruit. On top of that are two servings from the milk group and two servings from the meat group. At the apex are the fats, oils, and sweets, with the recommendation to "use sparingly."

Obviously things haven't worked out as the pyramid designers had hoped. Readers of this page I'm sure are clustered on the svelte end of the waistline spectrum. But—how to put this nicely?—in my travels across America this summer, I saw an awful lot of plus-sizes out there. The phrase that kept running through my head was "gross national product"-and I'm not an economist.

There are controversies about the pyramid, by the way, which have split the nutritional-advice community. Some people think the whole thing is a devious plot by the USDA to promote increased consumption of American agricultural products, in the guise of health advice. Others think it is pseudoscientific and has encouraged a whopping over-indulgence in "healthy" but high-calorie carbohydrates. Still others think it has led Americans to obsess about their food, when what they really need to do is exercise more.

My own investigations lead me to believe that a simple misunderstanding has subverted the good intentions of the pyramid builders.

Strictly for research purposes, I returned this August, as I try to do every year, to my favorite human feedlot-a restaurant called the Sirloin Stockade in Columbus, Indiana. Unless you live in the NAFTA Belt (from Mexico, north through Texas, to Oklahoma, Missouri, Kansas, Illinois, and Indiana), you probably

> lous steakhouse and buffet concept," as the

haven't enjoyed this "fabu-

parent corporation describes its chain of properties. For somewhat less than \$10 a head, you receive unlimited access to a high-end cafeteria (if that's not a contradiction in terms). Think fried chicken, shrimp, roast beef, steam table vegetables, fresh breads, every kind of potato, pizza, salad bar, cake, pie, ice cream sundaes—that

Until this year the steak was extra. But then the Golden Corral opened across town with its own Great Steak Buffet, featuring, yes, "all-you-can-eat sirloin steak." Now there's something of a sirloin shootout in town, and as a result the steaks have been added to the Stockade's prix-fixe menu.

sort of menu. Plus steak.

In an investigative spirit, I looked around to gauge what might be the median consumption in the crowded dining room, and tried my best to fit in. I weighed my tray down with several of the fabulous buffet concepts, starting with the sirloin and fried chicken, a couple of the yeast rolls, green beans, corn, broccoli, mashed potatoes, gravy, a little dressing, and some peach cobbler with vanilla ice cream. This looked about par for the first pass. Then I went back for another serving of peach cobbler a la mode, and a couple of the glazed cinnamon buns, which are put out fresh from the oven in trays of 24 and get gobbled up just as fast.

Unless I'm mistaken, that's pretty much the entire pyramid right there—the carbs, the vegetables, the fruit, dairy, and meat. And as prescribed, I used the fats, oils, and sweets sparingly. Only one pat of butter per roll. Quite a few of the patrons looked as if they had downed more

than one pyramid.

Of course, the pyramid is meant to represent "suggested daily servings." But who slows down to read the fine print? We're an achievement-oriented people-show us a pyramid, and we want to build it. And since we want to do a proper job of it, we try to shore up each level as we go, with

My suggestion to the USDA: Scrap the pyramid. The trouble with advice, even well-intended, is that people don't really need it. And they're less likely to use it as a guideline than they are to use it as an alibi. ("What do vou mean I shouldn't have had that box of Lucky Charms for a midnight snack? I'm just getting my daily requirement of the cereals group.")

extra servings.

The plus-sizing of America may not be pretty, but it's the visible evidence of a couple of astonishing historical achievements: An ordinary man can now afford to eat like a king on a daily basis. And almost nobody does hard physical labor anymore. We no longer work in corrals and stockades, but we like to eat as if we still did.

RICHARD STARR

<u>Correspondence</u>

THE CHINA SYNDROME

ARY SCHMITT WRITES in "The Real JEmpire" (September 1/September 8) that China, not the United States, is the sole multicultural empire left today. While I agree with him about China and the United States, Schmitt ignores another multicultural empire: the European Union. France and Germany have recognized that neither country can rule Europe alone, but together they have built the E.U., an institution that in all but name constitutes a Franco-German empire. Like good imperialists, they have found ways to co-opt the elites in the various societies they rule. Can we not see that the opposition by France and Germany to the war in Iraq was based on the threat to their interests posed by such a war, both by detaching "old" from "new" Europe and by weakening the institutions that aid the E.U.'s power?

JOSEPH SHIER Toronto, Ontario

BLACKOUT TERRORS

In his article "What the Blackout Made Clear" (September 1/September 8), Irwin M. Stelzer carefully analyzes the social, legal, and bureaucratic causes of the recent northeastern blackout, and then ends his otherwise astute article with a wisecrack: "All we have to do is surrender some due process protections, replace local with federal control... and add several billions to our electric bills. Perhaps an occasional blackout... is the lesser evil."

Stelzer omitted an important aspect of the blackout—it demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the American electric grid. Al Qaeda is now alerted to how simple it is to bring down the grid over a huge region. The events of August 14 send al Qaeda an invitation to try it.

America cannot possibly afford to station round-the-clock guards at every transformer and power tower. With all the "sleeper cells" hanging around in total boredom lately, it would be very simple for al Qaeda to arrange a coordinated attack, toppling several high-voltage towers at conveniently placed points.

Every utility knows how to tolerate

the sudden loss of one transmission line (lightning can cause that), and every regional system operates with a slight margin for such contingencies. However, the simultaneous loss of several major high-voltage lines is another story. Allowing for that would require a much bigger operating margin. From now on, every regional-system manager has to plan around the contingency that 10 percent of his transmission capability (in random locations) might vanish instantly. In order for the system to ride through the resulting surges and sags in power, it will be necessary (for technical reasons) to operate with a margin of around 30 percent.

Today, some sections of the grid operate very near to 100 percent of capacity. A safe assumption is that terrorists, should they try hard enough, will be able to figure out where those sections are. The only protection against an attack is to build a huge increase in transmission capacity at once, so that no transmission corridor operates near its limits.

If al Qaeda is vanquished (in a decade or two), that extra capability will be there to absorb the growing demand for electricity in the years ahead. But it would be extremely foolish to delay a major transmission-line construction program that is urgently needed now for homeland security.

Each component of Stelzer's closing remarks will come true, including most noticeably the billions added to electric bills (a reasonable guess: \$100 per person per year). Meanwhile, our military cannot slacken at all in the international war to wipe out terrorist organizations.

Thomas P. Sheahen Deer Park, MD

GENERAL CONFUSION

It is true, as I believe the *Democrat-Gazette* was the first to report, that General Wesley Clark voted in Arkansas's Democratic party primary in 2002. But this was not "an act that requires him to be a registered Democrat," as Matthew Continetti writes in "Drafting General Clark" (September 1/September 8).

Arkansas does not register voters by party affiliation. In any given year, a



<u>Correspondence</u>

qualified voter can choose to participate in the primary election of either party (but not, of course, in both).

We do agree with Continetti that it's significant Wesley Clark chose to lend a hand in selecting the Arkansas Democratic party's nominees last year, however.

GRIFFIN SMITH Executive Editor Arkansas Democrat-Gazette Little Rock, AR

THE KING OF COOLIDGE

In his splendid essay "The Neoconservative Persuasion" (August 25), Irving Kristol notes that in their selection of heroes, neoconservatives "politely overlook" such "conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge."

One wonders why, given Kristol's espousal of tax cuts as a "neoconservative" tenet because they stimulate growth and reduce so-called "class warfare." In his inaugural address, the thirtieth president, who cut taxes four times, took the same position as Kristol and offered an identical justification: "The method of raising revenue ought not to impede the transaction of business; it ought to encourage it. I am opposed to high rates, because they produce little or no revenue, because they are bad for the country, and, finally, because they are wrong. We cannot finance the country, we cannot improve social conditions, through any system of injustice, even if we attempt to inflict it upon the rich. Those who suffer the most will be the poor. This country believes in prosperity. It is absurd to suppose that it is envious of those who are already prosperous. The wise and correct course to follow in taxation and all other economic legislation is not to destroy those who have already secured success but to create conditions under which every one will have a better chance to be successful. The verdict of the country has been given on this question. The verdict stands. We shall do well to heed it."

As he did in so many matters, Ronald Reagan knew what he was doing when he hung Silent Cal's portrait in a place of honor in the White House Cabinet room. His action spawned a Coolidge revival among conservatives of all stripes. We would warmly welcome the "godfather of neoconservatism" into our ranks.

ALVIN S. FELZENBERG Washington, DC

THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY

I BEGAN ROBERT HARTWELL FISKE'S review of the eleventh edition of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary with great interest ("Don't Look It Up!" August 18) but finished it with an even greater incredulity.

Fiske argues that lexicographers are adding ephemeral and "illiterate" words



to their dictionaries, and that by doing so they are encouraging illiteracy. As an example, Fiske cites the conflation of "disinterested" and "uninterested"but neglects to mention the nearly 20 lines that the editors of the MW11 have included in their entry for "disinterested" explaining the development of the meaning of these two words, the historical basis for using "disinterested" to mean "not interested in," and the fact that actual evidence shows the meaning "not having a selfish motive or interest" is, in fact, the most used sense—so that the "vanished distinction" that Fiske laments is actually alive and well.

Fiske's other examples are similarly straw men. He fails to grasp that the

modern dictionary is not a portrait of the language, idealized by a sycophantic painter, but instead a mirror held up to show what the language actually looks like, warts and all. Thanks to vast improvements in the collection and analysis of language data, lexicographers can now report what people actually write (and, to a lesser extent, say) instead of what people think they write and say. Even a dictionary with a relatively small collection of language data, or a collection that's mostly citations instead of running text, such as Merriam-Webster's, can now rely on actual evidence instead of upon the introspection of lexicographers, who, if they were average speakers of English, would not be lexicographers.

Many of the "solecisms" Fiske rails against have a history of use in educated, edited English going back hundreds of years, and some have been used by well-respected and much-admired authors. Most, if not all, of them are mere shibboleths, or, at best, matters of taste where people in good conscience can differ.

If Fiske wants a book to guide users as to what is the highest generally accepted standard of educated English, I recommend a good usage manual (such as Bryan Garner's Dictionary of Modern American Usage). He should leave the lexicographers to do their jobs—reporting the facts, however ugly they may be to his eyes.

ERIN MCKEAN Oxford University Press Chicago, IL

THE WEEKLY STANDARD

welcomes letters to the editor.

Letters will be edited for length and clarity and must include the writer's name, address, and phone number.

All letters should be addressed:

Correspondence Editor

THE WEEKLY STANDARD

1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505

Washington, DC 20036.

You may also fax letters: (202) 293-4901 or email: editor@weeklystandard.com.



No way!

Oh, sure, some sparkling wines may look and even taste the part, but if it's not from Champagne, it's simply not true Champagne. That's because Champagne isn't merely a type of wine. It's a specific region 90 miles east of Paris with a long history of winemaking expertise.


Combine this unique northern location with a one of a kind climate and chalky soil as well as hundreds of years of experience and tradition. The result? The only grapes that yield the Champagne of legend — a heavenly wine that can be imitated but never duplicated. If the grapes aren't from this unique region where winemaking is a special art, then the wine really isn't authentic champagne.

It does matter where wines come from. A Napa wine is from Napa, a Willamette wine is from Willamette and a Red Mountain wine is from Red Mountain, Washington.

And, if it's not from Champagne, it's simply not true Champagne.



Books for Your FA Reading List




JOHN WESLEY A Biography STEPHEN TOMKINS Paperback • \$20.00

MY STRUGGLE **FOR FREEDOM**

Memoirs HANS KÜNG

Hardcover • \$32.00




DRAWN TO THE LIGHT


Poems on Rembrandt's Religious Paintings

MARILYN CHANDLER **McE**NTYRE

18 color plates

Hardcover • \$20.00





A BEARER OF **DIVINE REVELATION**


New and Selected Stories LAWRENCE DORR

Paperback • \$18.00



New and Selected Poems LUCI SHAW


Hardcover • \$18.00




WHOSE RELIGION IS CHRISTIANITY?


The Gospel Beyond the West LAMIN SANNEH

Paperback • \$12.00





MY GOD AND I A Spiritual Memoir LEWIS B. SMEDES Hardcover • \$20.00



THE LONG **GOOD NIGHT**

My Father's Journey into Alzheimer's

DAPHNE SIMPKINS

Hardcover • \$24.00

At your bookstore, or call 800-253-7521 www.eerdmans.com





Exit Arafat?

The people of Israel,

and the Palestinians,

deserve better, far better,

than to be bedeviled by

his presence.

"We think it would not be helpful to expel him because it would just give him another stage to play on."

—State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, after the Israeli government threatened to exile Yasser Arafat, Sept. 11, 2003

As You Like It to the contrary notwithstanding. All the world's real, and too many Israelis' and Palestinians' exits from it have been tragically premature, and horribly violent.

There are of course many, far too many, individuals and groups who bear responsibility for the violence that

has afflicted the Holy Land. But in the long Middle Eastern roster of ignominy one name stands out: Yasser Arafat. The virtual embodiment of modern terrorism, the main instigator of its resurgence against Israeli civilians in the last three years, the indirect cause therefore of the deaths of innocent Palestinian bystanders as Israel struck back, Arafat certainly

deserves exile—or worse. And the people of Israel, and the Palestinians, deserve better, far better, than to be bedeviled by his presence.

Whether it is prudent to remove him is of course another issue. We are inclined to believe it is. But that is admittedly a complicated question, involving on-the-ground calculations of the risks of harm to Arafat, and how damaging that harm would, or would not, turn out to be. But this is clear: Arafat, in Ramallah, has succeeded in torpedoing one peace process after another. He scorned Secretary of State Colin Powell's rather pathetic August 21 plea to work with Prime Minister Abbas and "make available" to Abbas the security forces Arafat controlled. We believe Arafat's ability to deny peace a chance would decrease if he were far away, especially if he were deprived of control of the Palestinian Authority's treasury, its money-making monopolies, and the security services.

But the State Department disagrees. For them, the world is a stage, and the applause of the "international community"—or rather, of other governments, including ones who do not themselves permit the free expression of their own people's opinions—tends to be everything.

Expelling Arafat would undoubtedly cause a raucous few days in the territories and in Arab capitals, and much disapproval elsewhere. European chancelleries would be the stages on which Arafat would cavort for a little while afterwards. But then we would all move on. Indeed, there would be, we suspect, much quiet eagerness to do so—much quiet approval—among the Palestinians who have suffered so much as a result of Arafat's disastrous leadership. And there might well be—we think there would be—less death, and more hope for peace, in the Middle East.

The government of Israel will decide whether and how

to follow through on its threat to remove Arafat. The American government can and should give the Israeli government our best counsel in private, and perhaps in public as well. But the administration's professed reasons for opposing the removal of Arafat are unimpressive. And they seem altogether de-linked from any underlying moral and strategic judg-

ment of what the war on terror requires, and what those who support and sponsor terror deserve.

Right now, to take just one example, Mullah Omar is hiding in the wilds of Afghanistan or Pakistan, subject to being killed if and when we find him. In what way is Yasser Arafat morally distinguishable from Mullah Omar? Is he less complicit in terror? For a decade, Israel bent over backwards to try to engage in a peace process with the chief terrorist of Palestine. Arafat has succeeded in sabotaging the hopes of peace. Justice demands that he be removed. Prudence may well concur. America is engaged in a war against terror. Surely the honorable course is to be a sympathetic counselor of, not a supercilious lecturer to, an embattled fellow democracy that has suffered more terror—and, yes, has borne it with more forbearance—than even we have.

We suspect Arafat will be removed, sooner rather than later, by the government of Israel. When that happens, the negative consequences can be minimized, and the positive opportunities maximized, only by unequivocal solidarity between the two terror-opposing democracies.

—William Kristol

Two, Three, Many Seats

Republicans have high hopes for Senate pickups in 2004. By Fred Barnes

ongressman Richard Burr is "the perfect candidate," says Sen. George Allen of Virginia, in what may be a perfect year for a Republican to run for the Senate in North Carolina. He's a former defensive back for Wake Forest University. He has a conservative voting record, but a moderate image. He's energetic, likable, and anything but strident. Burr knows more about health care than practically any member of Congress—a valuable quality in an era when Medicare reform and prescription drug benefits are perennial issues. He has the enthusiastic support of the Bush White House. Bush adviser Karl Rove not only encouraged Burr to run, he spoke at a fundraiser in Winston-Salem last April that raised \$680,000 for Burr's campaign.

History is on Burr's side. Republicans have won seven of the last nine Senate races in North Carolina. And the only two Democrats to win-John Edwards in 1998 and Terry Sanford in 1986—succeeded in nonpresidential years. Bush will be on the ballot in 2004, and he's quite popular in North Carolina. In 2000, he carried the state by 13 points. Last year, Bush aided Elizabeth Dole in her 9-point victory for the Senate over Democrat Erskine Bowles, once chief of staff at the Clinton White House. Bowles is Burr's likely opponent next year.

A Burr victory, picking up the Democratic seat Edwards is vacating, would be a critical part of a Republican success story in gaining Senate

Fred Barnes is executive editor of The Weekly Standard.

seats in 2004. Which depends on several things, two of which are probable (I think): an improved economy that numerous indicators now point to and a safer, more stable Iraq. A third factor, a liberal Democratic presidential nominee like Howard Dean, could cinch the deal for Republicans. Such a candidate would fare poorly in three open Democratic seats in the South (North and South

For Republicans in the South, the last-minute injection of presidential support—what Burr calls the "Georgia model"—will probably be missing in 2004.

Carolina and Georgia) and the two that might become open (Louisiana and Florida). Dean, who's been dubbed "McGovern on steroids," could drag down Democratic candidates in conservative states.

That's the Republican dream scenario, at any rate. But dreams, expectations, even empirically grounded predictions are often not realized in politics. A scenario that seems obvious and unassailable can implode. Democrats suffered exactly that in 2002. They thought the weak economy would doom Republican candidates for the House and Senate. And they figured they'd inoculated themselves by passing an Iraq war resolution. But no. Homeland security

turned out to be pivotal. Bush and Republicans hammered away at the issue and won seats in the first midterm election, the one that's supposed to go badly for a new president's party.

So what could go wrong for Republicans? Lots of things. Maybe the situation in Iraq and/or the economy will sour. Jobs are an enormous problem in North Carolina. The textile industry has collapsed, furniture manufacturing is declining, and technology and banking jobs are beginning to dry up, if not leaving the state. A strong economy nationally may not halt the job drain in North Carolina. "Jobs is something I talk about frequently," Burr says.

No doubt Bowles will dwell on that issue and blame Bush and Burr. Bowles is one of the Democrats' best non-incumbent candidates. He lost to Dole in 2002, but the race was a dead heat until it broke open in the final days. In Burr, he faces an opponent without Dole's star power. Bowles has money—he spent \$6.5 million of personal wealth against Dole—and excellent name recognition. He's generally perceived as a moderate. Now if he were a moderate Republican, Bowles would be unbeatable. In any case, Burr is no more than a narrow favorite at this point, largely because North Carolina has been trending Republican.

For Republicans in the South, the last-minute injection of presidential support—what Burr calls the "Georgia model"—will probably be missing in 2004. Bush barnstormed through Georgia and North Carolina on the eve of the 2002 election, galvanizing Republicans and stirring them to vote. But next year Bush is all but certain to take Southern states (except Florida) for granted and concentrate his campaign time on battleground states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. So Burr will have to defeat Bowles on his own.

The fondest Republican hope is that two more Democratic senators retire: John Breaux of Louisiana and Bob Graham of Florida. Absent

Breaux, a reasonable Republican candidate would be favored in Louisiana. Without Graham, the odds would be roughly 50-50 on a Republican pickup. But Republicans may lose a shoo-in incumbent, Don Nickles of Oklahoma, who is yet to announce his intentions. Also, a Democratic breakthrough in Oklahoma, with a Senate candidate such as moderate congressman Brad Carson, is conceivable.

A Republican sweep would include victories in South Carolina, where Democratic senator Fritz Hollings is retiring, and Georgia, where Democrat Zell Miller is quitting after less than one term. Congressman Johnny Isakson is the strongest Republican in Georgia and should be able to beat Democrat Andy Young, who's been the mayor of Atlanta, a member of the House, and the ambassador to the United Nations. In South Carolina, an ugly Democratic primary fight between school superintendent Inez Tennenbaum and Columbia mayor Bob Coble will make a Republican victory even more probable than it already is. The likely Republican candidate is congressman Jim DeMint.

North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Florida—that's five potential Republican pickups. But there's a catch. Brad Woodhouse of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee points out that Republicans had trouble recruiting candidates. In Illinois, with an open seat because Republican senator Peter Fitzgerald is retiring, the White House urged former (but still popular) governor Jim Edgar to run. He almost said yes, then declined, and now the seat will probably go to a Democrat. In Washington, Republican congresswoman Jennifer Dunn rejected pleas to challenge Democratic senator Patty Murray. Republican congressman George Nethercutt has stepped in, but he's from eastern Washington and most of the state's voters are in the west.

In South Dakota, ex-congressman John Thune has not decided whether

to take on Senate Democratic leader Tom Daschle. If he chooses not to, Daschle is safe. In Nevada, Republican congressman Jim Gibbons is passing up a contest against Democratic senator Harry Reid. In Arkansas, both governor Mike Huckabee and Drug Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchinson would have been strong Republican challengers of Democratic senator Blanche Lincoln. Both declined. In North Dakota, Republican former governor Ed Schaeffer said no to a race against Democratic senator Byron Dorgan.

Then there's Alaska. Gov. Frank Murkowski, a Republican, named his daughter Lisa to replace him in the Senate. This did not go down well with other Republicans, much less Democrats. She's proved to be a capable enough senator, but she's a pro-choice moderate in a conservative state. She may have a serious primary challenge. Worse, the only Democrat with a chance of beating her, ex-governor Tony Knowles, is

running. He's no powerhouse, but neither is she.

So here's how it adds up. Republicans have a shot of netting up to five Senate seats. The makeup of the Senate today is 51-49 Republican, counting Vermont's Jim Jeffords, supposedly an independent, as a Democrat. The best guess now is that Republicans gain four Senate seats in the South, lose Illinois and perhaps Alaska. That's based on the emergence of a good economy, a better Iraq, and the reelection of Bush. Democrats, by the way, would be ecstatic if they hold Republicans to the current 51-49 edge.

The Burr race in North Carolina is central to Republican success. GOP leaders and the White House helped clear the field for Burr. And he has the advantage of support across the board from Republicans. In fact, former senator Jesse Helms, the conservative icon, has offered to stump for Burr. Helms uses a wheelchair these days, but he told Burr, "I'll let you push me wherever you want to."





Jump-start your newspaper journalism career with a solid program that boasts four Pulitzer Prize winners among its alumni — the Pulliam Journalism Fellowship. The Fellowship offers myriad career opportunities; in fact, a Pulliam Fellow from our first class of 1974, Barbara Henry, now serves as president and publisher of *The Indianapolis Star*.

Now entering its 31st year, the 2004 Pulliam Journalism Fellowship helps build a bridge from the classroom to the newsroom. Fellows are assigned to *The Indianapolis Star* or *The Arizona Republic* in Phoenix for 10 weeks each summer as staff reporters. We award 20 Fellowships annually. The stipend is \$6,500.

Our Fellowships are open to college sophomores, juniors and seniors pursuing a career in newspaper journalism. We will be accepting applications for our Summer 2004 program as of September 2003.

Visit our Web site at http://www.indystar.com/pjf or e-mail Fellowship director Russell B. Pulliam at russell.pulliam@indystar.com for an application packet. You also may request a packet by writing:

Russell B. Pulliam, Director The Pulliam Journalism Fellowship P.O. Box 145 Indianapolis, IN 46206-0145

September 22, 2003 The Weekly Standard / 11

End of the Road Map.

And the beginning of a new Israeli strategy. BY TOM ROSE

Ferusalem THE SUICIDE BOMBING that killed 22 people including 6 small children in Jerusalem on August 19 ended the so-called "hudna" (cease-fire) between competing Palestinian terror groups and Israel. It also killed any pretense of faith in the "road map." The oversold peace plan collapsed upon and crushed its own creation, the young government of Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas. Controlling only 3 of Yasser Arafat's 12 "security" organizations, Abbas could not hope to meet Israeli and American demands for a crackdown on terrorists after the bus bombing, even had he wanted to.

When Arafat loyalists used Arafatcontrolled Palestinian television and radio to publicly threaten Abbas with death if he tried to crack down, Abbas got the message and resigned. In the wake of his departure and the resumption of terror in the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israelis too seemed to acknowledge that they had reached the

end of their road. They were left with no choice but to rid themselves and the region of the menace of Yasser Arafat once and for all.

In contrast to the ceremonial installation of Abbas as the first Palestinian prime minister, Arafat's naming of his crony Ahmed Ourei to succeed Abbas was dismissed in Jerusalem. Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz, Sharon's most influential and popular minister, called Qurei a lackey whose

Tom Rose is publisher of the Jerusalem Post.

sole purpose was to find a way to preempt his boss's expulsion.

quickly

Ourei

announced the formation of a "security ni Missions, Bethlehem First, the Wolf's Lair, and finally the road

government" whose purpose will be to "confront security threats and enforce the rule of law in Palestinian Authority areas." But unlike previous

moves designed to generate enough international pressure to preempt Israeli action, Qurei's story had no takers. Not even the Europeans seemed ready to lend assistance.

The Israeli Security Cabinet's statement of September 11 that it had decided in principle to "remove" Arafat was the final acknowledgment that it was no longer possible to ignore the elephant in the living room. Amid all the variables that have attended this murderous conflict, Arafat is the one outstanding constant. For three years, Israelis tried everything short of facing the Arafat question head on. Nothing worked. The Mitchell Plan, the Tenet Plan, the Seven Quiet Days, the Zin-

> map: all failures. Now, 800 dead Israelis later-15 last week alone—Israelis have concluded that it is more dangerous to host Arafat than to eliminate him.

As if waking from a national coma, Israelis suddenly realized that one man was protecting the Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist organizations from dismantlement, and he was Arafat. The one man preventing the creation of a consolidated security service capable of fighting terror was Arafat.

Arafat was working to kill the road map so that its goal of establishing a Palestinian state at peace with Israel could nev-

> er be realized. Even the most dovish Israelis no longer seem interested in denying the obvious: It isn't Israel that is preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. It's Arafat, whose goal

is not a Palestine next to Israel, but rather Israel itself. A Palestinian state at peace with Israel is a greater threat to Arafat than it is to Israel. Underwhy, given the choice between the

road map and Hamas, Arafat chose Hamas. They share the same goal: the destruction of Israel.

Ironically, those who thought supporting Arafat was synonymous with supporting a Palestinian state are the very ones who have helped prevent it. Arafat's supporters at the U.N. and in the E.U. did not remove obstacles to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, they reinforced them. By wedding themselves to Arafat, his international allies allowed the Palestinian dictator to loot and plunder his people. Since Israel brought Arafat back to the West Bank in 1994 as part of the Oslo Accords, Palestinian GDP has declined 70 percent. Think of it: two-thirds of the collective national Palestinian wealth destroyed. During that same period, despite the hightech bust and the terror war waged against it, Israel's GDP doubled.

An option dismissed in August as the fanciful concoction of an unstable fringe became state policy in September. The Israeli mood was best expressed by a middle-aged woman interviewed in a supermarket who said matter-of-factly that Israel was like the alcoholic no longer able to deny his disease. There are but two choices left: either to conquer the disease or to let it conquer you.

The signals from Washington were mixed. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, though he called the potential expulsion of Arafat "not helpful," also noted: "We were making progress without dealing with Arafat. When we were dealing with Arafat, we weren't making progress. That is the objective fact. . . . We had a failed leadership that wasn't leading us anywhere. That's been tried. Been there, done that. Road don't lead nowhere."

With Saddam gone, a U.S. administration increasingly disgusted with Arafat, and Europeans demonstrating growing impatience with the whole affair, the international climate for Arafat's expulsion, while not risk-free, is more amenable than it has been.

Neither the road map's collapse nor Israel's looming "removal" of Arafat prompted Morocco or Jordan to alter or condition its decision to reestablish relations with Israel, broken off at the start of Arafat's terror war. Nor did it prevent Prime Minister Sharon from celebrating the tenth anniversary of an extraordinarily significant relationship that Bombay and Jerusalem were calling the "Indo-Israeli Alliance" during his high-profile state visit to India. The growth increment alone in this year's trade between Israel and India will be greater than the entire GDP of the Palestinian Authority.

But Arafat has not yet been completely abandoned. He still has the Saudis. Last week Israeli intelligence revealed that Saudi Arabia has forward-deployed its two most sophisticated battle-ready squadrons of F-15s to the secret Tabuq airfield in the northwest corner of the kingdom, just 90 miles from Israel. Israel warned Saudi Arabia it was fully prepared to defend itself against any aggressor. Compounding the news of the forward deployments, U.S. inves-

tigators claim to have confirmed Israeli intelligence about an advanced al Qaeda plot to use those very bases to stage 9/11-style terror attacks against up to five Tel Aviv skyscrapers.

Arguments that exile would only give Arafat a bigger stage were drowned out by reminders that Arafat's last exile, between 1982 and 1993, saw the emergence of an alternative Palestinian leadership. It wasn't the world stage that made Arafat globally relevant, it was Israel. Opponents used to argue that Arafat only needs a cell phone to stay in control of "his people." Advocates of expulsion say that depriving Arafat of physical centrality deprives him of the ability to lead, which in turn will force the creation of a new Palestinian leadership.

Whether this new leadership will be better or worse than the malignant one that is about to be removed is a question Israelis and Palestinians will soon see answered. One way or another.



Not Defending the Defensible

The Justice Department's civil liberties record is better than it lets on. **BY THOMAS F. POWERS**

HAT'S THERE TO SAY about Attorney General John Ashcroft's 16-city speaking tour on the subject of the Patriot Act, which ended in New York two days before the second anniversary of September 11?

For starters, the Bush administration continues to avoid addressing Americans' concerns about civil liberties. Faced with an opportunity to defend the administration's record, amid mounting criticism, Ashcroft failed to do so. And now that the president is asking Congress to broaden the powers granted by the Patriot Act, critics of the administration have their talking points handed to them on a platter. Take the response of House Judiciary Committee member John Convers to the president's request: "We will continue to say no until Ashcroft explains why he has abused the power he already has."

The second observation to make is that Ashcroft's failure was largely one of rhetorical strategy, which is in a way fortunate, since that can be fixed. The only problem is that Ashcroft seems to think that touting the contributions of American policing to domestic security will by itself alleviate anxiety about civil liberties.

This is a fundamentally negative posture and one that threatens to frame debate over the issues in an unhelpful way. It is also, politically, a sure loser.

The central theme of Ashcroft's speeches is that the defense of America's security at home and abroad is the defense of Americans' liberties.

Thomas F. Powers teaches constitutional law at the University of Minnesota, Duluth.

"The first responsibility of government is to provide the security that preserves the lives and liberty of the people." "Because we are safer, our liberties are more secure." Freedom is thus, above all, "freedom from terrorism." Consistent with this message has been the choice of audiences on this tour: As his critics have pointed



out, Ashcroft has taken his message to law enforcement, not to the public, and he has not been willing to answer questions from the press.

This rhetorical strategy is both evasive and unnecessarily timid. By hiding behind security, the government does a disservice to its own (eminently defensible) civil liberties record since September 11. The attorney general's vision also sets the stage for an empty standoff between a camp of security and a camp of liberty that will ultimately serve no purpose other than the perceived partisan advantages of each side.

The closest thing in Ashcroft's speeches to an attempt to address directly the criticisms of civil libertarians is his oft-repeated claim that the government's efforts have been carried out in accordance with the law. Which is true, but beside the point. After all, strictly speaking, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II was also perfectly legal.

Subtler thinking is needed—because there is no magic formula for deciding what is or is not an appropriate "balance" between liberty and security. Our situation today is characterized not by any one simple civil liberties challenge or question, but by an extraordinarily complex set of questions about police powers in a time of terrorism. And up to now these questions have necessarily been addressed in the heat of the moment and without prolonged discussion or debate.

No one who understands the logic of liberal democracy will think that civil liberties concerns (real or imagined) can long be ignored by those who govern. Civil libertarians may be wrong about the Patriot Act and about the record of American law enforcement to date, but that doesn't mean the Justice Department should ignore them. Wise and strong leadership in a liberal democracy necessarily means facing civil libertarian criticisms directly and clearly. Without having to trust the other side to be fair in its criticisms (the partisan dimension of this debate need notindeed, should not—be forgotten), the government can safely assume that by addressing its critics it begins to reassure the public at large.

And reassuring the public at large is what the protection of civil liberties is all about. In the logic of liberal democracy, freedom is first and foremost the sense that we have nothing to fear from the government. Public perception is not always a reliable guide to policy, but in the case of civil liberties it is in a way the entire point of policy.

Public perception in the current situation suggests that the strategy set

forth by Ashcroft is not adequate to the task. Opinion polls show the gradual advance of civil libertarian concern among the public over the past two years. Public concern is also reflected in a grass-roots campaign involving more than 150 cities and towns (and the states of Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont) officially critical of elements of the Patriot Act. And, of course, the Patriot Act has become a whipping boy for Democratic presidential candidates, though Republican politicians, too, are signaling concern. In the House, 113 GOP members voted in July to block funding of some Patriot Act searches.

By staking its case on the importance of security vis-à-vis civil liberties, the government has allowed its critics to present themselves as the one and only voice for civil liberties. Fortunately, there are members of the administration whose public statements suggest a different approach. In a number of speeches, most notably in his June address to the

American Civil Liberties Union, FBI director Robert Mueller welcomed the opportunity to debate the many civil liberties issues that have emerged and even admitted that the debate poses hard questions. The standing ovation Mueller got from the ACLU is not the point of such efforts (he also faced hostile questions), but it does suggest that open debate would be a good strategy for trying to alleviate public anxiety.

Others, like federal appeals court judge Michael Chertoff, onetime head of the Justice Department's criminal division, have waded into the debate at the crucial level of the many details of the law. More of this sort of open and public dialogue and debate by the government would go a long way to dispel civil libertarian worries.

But to make a lasting impression, something more may be needed. One problem with the original Patriot Act was that it had to be drafted and passed quickly, without a thorough debate in Congress. Perhaps the administration should present the current effort to stiffen anti-terrorism laws even further as precisely an opportunity to review the record to date and to clear the air.

Another possibility mentioned on both the left and right would be a new court to deal with terrorists (either U.S. citizens captured abroad or aliens captured on U.S. soil) and the legal conundrums posed by such cases. Here's an opportunity to make a lasting contribution to the constitutional question of wartime civil liberties that could unite left and right in a common aim.

At any rate, the government needs to make an effort that is unmistakable and effective. The Bush administration has a good post-9/11 record on civil liberties, a record that it can and must defend. The attorney general's strategy—to talk only about security—makes defending that record impossible and, indeed, fuels suspicion that it's not being defended because it cannot be.



Now You See It, Now You Don't

Resorting to magical thinking about our defense obligations. **BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN**

T'S ODD: A secretary of defense in charge of vital counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and nation-building operations that have stretched the armed forces to the breaking point is fiercely fighting increases in the size of those forces. Despite calls for more troops from senators John McCain, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Joe Biden, and many others, Donald Rumsfeld has developed plans that rely on magic to cover over the reality that our armed forces are too small. When, inevitably, the magic fails, the United States may find itself in a terrible position in Iraq and in the world.

At first, Rumsfeld appeared to accept the premise that there were not enough combat troops available for the missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. He proposed a plan to increase the number of soldiers in combat formations by "civilianizing" Defense Department jobs currently held by active-duty soldiers. At the same time, he proclaimed that larger forces really are not necessary because superior intelligence capabilities will allow the United States to predict our enemies' actions and enable us to send precisely tailored forces to threatened areas just in time. Both of these proposals conceal the risks and costs that they entail.

Uniformed personnel whom civilians might replace come from two categories: the intellectual parts of the armed forces devoted to longrange planning, concept development, education, and training, and the logistical system that is one of our

Frederick W. Kagan is a military historian and the coauthor of While America Sleeps.

greatest advantages over allies and enemies. Excluding uniformed personnel from the intellectual activities of the armed forces would exacerbate a trend toward anti-intellectualism in the services. In the worst case, it would leave the United States with uniformed military technicians executing plans and concepts designed by civilian contractors. Given Rumsfeld's interactions with the military to date, there is reason to suspect that this is, indeed, his goal. The Defense Department, moreover, has already gone far toward entrusting its military thinking to civilians, as the proliferation of projects run by outside think tanks attests. This unfortunate development should be reversed, not reinforced.

Turning the multifarious logistical positions now occupied by uniformed personnel over to civilians is even more misguided. Civilian personnel differ from military personnel in two critical respects. First, they are bound by contracts that specify precisely the duties they are to perform and the circumstances under which they are to perform them. Military personnel are on call 24/7 and their duties are whatever their superiors order them to do. Second, civilians are not expected to face personal danger and do not have the same protection as military personnel. It is neither reasonable nor just—nor in many cases legal—to expect them to place themselves in harm's way.

These differences have consequences for military activities. When things absolutely have to get done at a certain time, it is possible to order uniformed personnel to do whatever it takes to accomplish them. Civilian

contractors cannot be so ordered—their supervisors are legally obliged to abide by the terms of their contracts. Even at critical times, then, civilian contractors may not get things done, and the military personnel relying on them may have no recourse.

This problem is acute in theaters of war, where contractors may become targets of enemy missiles and bombs. Civilian contractors may be no less brave or willing to bear risks than soldiers, but they are neither trained nor equipped to do so. Nor do they have the health care and insurance benefits that help make facing those risks acceptable to the uniformed military or the family support structures that make prolonged deployments tolerable for their families.

One could design contracts for these personnel, to be sure, that put them on call 24/7, provide training and equipment, supply medical and insurance benefits and access to family support structures. But when one has done all of that, one has simply created soldiers without uniforms, and eliminated all of the cost benefits that Rumsfeld sees in "civilianizing" the armed forces.

Further reliance on technology and its supposed efficiencies is equally unacceptable. The notion that U.S. security should *depend* on the ability of our intelligence technology to warn us of attacks or threats suggests bankruptcy of thought at the senior levels of the Pentagon. It should be enough to list the most recent intelligence failures—notably the September 11 attacks and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq—to show the absurdity of this idea.

More important, this proposal completely misses the current crisis facing the U.S. military. American forces are not overstretched by the danger from potential new crises, foreseen or unforeseen. They are stretched to the breaking point by our current requirements in Iraq alone. Even completely eliminating the U.S. deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan would not save enough

troops to make the current deployment in Iraq sustainable. It would free up perhaps 4 of the 12 combat brigades needed to maintain our current force levels in Iraq for more than a year. Perfect clairvoyance about future crises would neither alleviate the current situation nor, for that matter, help us meet new crises, for which we have no forces available.

Recently, Rumsfeld and others have begun to argue that American forces in Iraq can be largely replaced by troops drawn from the international community and by Iraqis themselves, thus obviating the need for any change in the American military

structure at all. Considering Rumsfeld's focus on the need for perfect intelligence, this notion is amazingly shortsighted. The single most important source of intelligence in Iraq as in any peacekeeping, nation-building, or counterinsurgency situation—is troops on the ground. Those troops interact with the local population, learn which sources they can trust, and are trusted in turn by the locals to act promptly and intelligently on good information. Replacing American troops with Iraqis will

reduce the amount and accuracy of the intelligence we receive.

For one thing, the Iraqis' traditional solutions to internal disorder involved torture and execution more than the painstaking gathering of intelligence for surgical raids. It will take more than the few months Rumsfeld and others claim to get Iraqi recruits to levels at which they will be useful in these functions. For another thing, some of the Iraqi troops we recruit are certain to be double agents. They will give warning of our activities to the enemy, and

they will shield the enemy by providing us with bad information. This sort of thing is going on daily in Iraq already, and it is the job of American soldiers to distinguish good reports from bad. The more we turn the problems of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism over to the Iraqis, the more we place these double agents in positions from which they can do us great harm.

Some international troops will perform their functions well, and, of course, they can be expected to be on our side. Internationalization, however, has significant drawbacks. Each participating state has its own agenda.



Rumsfeld at Camp Babylon, Iraq, September 6

Some, like the Poles, mainly want to please the United States in hopes of benefiting from a closer relationship. Others, like the Dutch, may have other national interests in mind: Royal Dutch Petroleum is a significant player in the Dutch economy, and KLM has been maneuvering to become the principal carrier to Iraq. The neutrality of such contingents is much more questionable. The use of troops from Muslim countries raises still other concerns, including their reliability, the danger of militant infiltration of their ranks, and the possibility of

conflict with the Iraqis, who are by no means friendly with all of the world's other Muslims.

The biggest problem with internationalization, however, may prove to be that it is impossible. There are very few troops available in the world to support the Iraq operation, and France and other critical states are already indicating that they will participate only at an unacceptable cost.

Each one of these solutions, in short, boils down to magic. Soldiers can be made to appear at relatively low cost. Intelligence technology will eliminate surprise, allowing us to act on the narrowest possible margin.

Half-trained Iraqis will relieve thousands of U.S. soldiers. International support will allow American troops to go home soon.

Secretary Rumsfeld is concealing not only the price tag for his approach, but also its dangers. If the technology fails, or the international community does not support us, or the Iraqi police and security forces turn out to be unreliable and ineffective, the United States will fail in Iraq, with horrible consequences. That outcome is unacceptable. To

avoid it, the United States must be prepared to keep troop levels in Iraq as high as, or higher than, they are now for a considerable period of time. America will not be able to sustain such a deployment over the long term without increasing its armed forces. Right now, America's security strategy rests on a razor's edge. If anything goes wrong in Iraq or elsewhere, the United States cannot rise to the challenge. Rumsfeld's claims can only conceal that danger. But this is no time to engage in a fairy-tale defense.

September 22, 2003 The Weekly Standard / 17

Mr. Keynes Goes to Washington

The economic consequences of the war. **BY IRWIN M. STELZER**

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION has learned something about the economic consequences of the war. It was not so long ago that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz assured Congress, "We're dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." The administration now estimates that in the next fiscal year we will spend \$51 billion on military operations in Iraq, \$11 billion on such operations in Afghanistan, \$20 billion on rebuilding and securing Iraq, about \$1 billion for reconstruction in Afghanistan, and another \$4 billion on other chores related to the war on terror.

This \$87 billion estimate, put before the American people by President Bush in his September 7 address to the nation, assumes that the number of troops stationed in Iraq can safely be drawn down from the current level of 140,000 to 110,000 by this time next year, that other countries will contribute up to \$40 billion, and that the sales of Iraq's oil will make an additional \$15 billion available. The basis for the administration's optimism on all these points is known only to the Pentagon. If past misestimates are any guide, it's safe to say that the new figure is at the bottom of the range that independent experts would be likely to offer.

Democrats, and not a few Repub-

Irwin M. Stelzer is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, and a columnist for the Sunday Times (London).

licans, profess to be suffering from a bad case of sticker shock, with some rediscovering the "Come home, America" theme that served them so ill 40 years ago. Nevertheless, the president will get what he wants from a Congress fearful of being accused of abandoning our troops, or of forcing a humiliating, Somaliastyle withdrawal that would encourage terrorists to believe America is

Borrowing to finance the war does pass some of the burden on to future generations, but that is appropriate since those generations will share the benefits of the eventual victory.

weak. Which means that the nation's fiscal situation will become still more complicated.

Even before the president conceded that Iraq's oil revenues could not begin to cover reconstruction costs, the federal budget was headed for a deficit of some \$500 billion, give or take the odd \$100 billion. That represented about 4.2 percent of GDP, considered not at all nervous-making by administration spokesmen. But add in the \$87 billion that the president is now asking for the war on terror, and you crowd 5 percent. Make the not unreason-

able assumption that the president will win his fight to have his "temporary" tax cuts made permanent, throw in the \$400 billion the president wants to spend over the next decade on a prescription drug program, add the \$15 billion he is asking to fight AIDS in Africa, and other billions that he will allow Congress to tack on for its favorite programs, and you quickly get a budget deficit equal to or above the 6 percent post-World War II record, set in 1983.

Even many of those who support the president's view that we must "do what is necessary, . . . spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror" are concerned about the consequences of such deficits. For one thing, the American people are being told that no sacrifice is too great to root out terrorism, only to find tax refunds in their mailboxes, and no abatement in the expansion of entitlement programs that are already so costly as to threaten fiscal mayhem when the baby boom generation reaches retirement age.

More immediately, the combination of a soaring budget deficit and a rising trade deficit means that we depend in part for our economic well-being on the continued willingness of China, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong to add to the \$700 billion of Treasury securities they already hold (up 36 percent since the end of 2001). China's promise to step up its purchases of Treasury bonds, allegedly extracted from the regime's leadership by Treasury secretary John Snow on his recent trip to Asia, will help to prevent bond prices from falling, and interest rates from rising as much as they otherwise might.

But even if the Chinese keep their word when differences with America over foreign policy issues inevitably arise, interest rates are likely to end up higher than they otherwise would. As the economic recovery gathers momentum, the private sector will be increasing its demands on capital markets, competing for funds

with the increasingly debt-ridden government. That will make it more expensive for businesses to raise the money to finance expansion and create jobs.

Worse still, late last week the government announced that the trade deficit has once again risen. That means that foreigners, most importantly central banks, are sitting on a higher-than-ever pile of dollars. If they decide prudence requires them to diversify their assets by dumping dollars, perhaps in order to increase holdings of gold, the Fed might have to raise interest rates in order to make it more attractive for foreigners to hold dollar assets.

These dangers could be avoided if the administration were willing to confront Americans with the cost of waging this war. Democrats suggest that the costs can be met by repealing the Bush tax cuts. But that would remove one of the main forces that has prevented a slowing economy from slipping into recession. Faced with the need to fight a twofront war-on recession and on terrorism—Bush chose the right weapons: tax cuts to stimulate growth and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight terror. Borrowing to finance the war does pass some of the burden on to future generations, but that is appropriate since those generations will share the benefits of the eventual victory.

It is the Bush team's stubborn insistence on expanding the welfare state so as to please voters in the upcoming elections that smacks of fiscal irresponsibility. In Through The Looking-Glass, Lewis Carroll offers a paradox: "The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam today." Paradox is not for a White House obsessed with avoiding another one-term Bush presidency. It served up jam yesterday in the form of temporary tax cuts, is offering jam today by making them permanent, and is promising jam tomorrow, the prescription drug benefit. That just might be a bit too much of a sweet thing for the nation's health.

Unfair and Unbalanced

Why the media did a lousy job covering the intifada. By Joshua Muravchik

O SOONER was Saddam Hussein chased from power than CNN revealed that it had often held its tongue about his savagery for fear of losing access to Iraq and provoking violent retribution. Although the confession was stunning, it was only the most recent chapter in a long story. Tyrannies have often managed to compromise Western journalists—by threats, bribes, and trickery. The New York Times covered up the story of Soviet famines in the 1930s. The Times of London hailed Hitler's "night of long knives" as an effort to "impose a high standard on Nazi officials." Mao, Fidel, Ho, Avatollah Khomeini, and Nicaraguan Sandinistas all succeeded at whitewashing their portrayal in the Western media. To this list, we can add the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

I recently completed a study of coverage of the Palestinian *intifada* that found scores of stories displaying imbalance or outright inaccuracy tilted against Israel. Some of this reflected bias—not anti-Semitism, but the perception of the conflict as "an epic struggle of the weak against the strong," in the words of one correspondent for the *Economist*. More often, however, the cause lay in the asymmetry of the news environments of a democracy and a tyranny. (I use the word "tyranny" since Yasser Arafat's rule has rested more on the

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His monograph, Covering the Intifada: How the Media Reported the Palestinian Uprising, has just been released by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

dozen or so "security" services that he has always controlled personally than on the election he won without meaningful opposition.)

Among the American news outlets, only one ground the same axe night after night: ABC TV. On the second day of the intifada, in late September 2000, a mob of Palestinians atop the Temple Mount besieged an Israeli police outpost and rained bottles and stones down on the Jewish worshippers at the Wailing Wall below. Israeli police and soldiers rushed the worshippers to cover, then stormed the mount to relieve the siege and disperse the mob. Other networks aired this full sequence, but viewers of ABC were shown only the Israeli counterattack. The description that accompanied it reinforced the one-sided image. "This is the second day in a row [Israeli forces] have flexed their muscles here, and Palestinians are furious," observed correspondent Gillian Findlay, downplaying the responsive nature of the Israeli action.

Four Palestinians died in that confrontation, and an Israeli also fell victim to violence that day. He was one of two Israeli policemen on a joint patrol in Oalgilya with a Palestinian counterpart who suddenly drew his gun and shot them both, killing one and wounding the other. Unlike the Palestinians' deaths, this was cold-blooded murder, and it was of more far-reaching significance in that it signified the end of the Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation that had lain at the heart of the Oslo process. Peter Jennings opened that evening's report by declaring somberly: "Four Palestinians were killed by Israelis on [the Temple Mount] today." Neither he

nor anyone else on ABC mentioned the Israeli murdered by a Palestinian.

On various other evenings, viewers of ABC, like those who got their news from other outlets, would have heard Palestinian leaders vociferously deny any connection with the arms-smuggling ship Karine-A intercepted by Israel, but unlike other viewers or readers, they would never have known of the ship captain's confession that the weapons had indeed been destined for the Palestinian Authority. Like viewers of other networks, they would have seen the destruction wrought by Israeli forces advancing into Jenin in the spring of 2002, but unlike the others, they would never have seen the booby traps that killed many Israeli soldiers, which prompted the widespread demolitions. Like the viewers of other networks, they would have learned that the Palestinians had declared various "days of rage," but ABC's viewers were the only ones who would have heard that Israeli settlers did likewise, as Peter Jennings reported more than once, an "exclusive" he seems simply to have invented.

CNN was the one other outlet whose reportage was consistently off kilter, marked by intermittent bias compounded with ignorance. During the second week of the intifada, the network reported that "Unrest in the Middle East has spread to other Arab nations. Thousands marched in Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday to condemn Israel." In light of the network's post-Saddam confession, it is hard to believe that CNN did not know that when thousands marched in Baghdad during his reign, it was only because they were told to march: Whatever such marches bespoke, it was not "unrest." When the United States abstained on a typically one-sided U.N. Security Council resolution blaming Israel for the turmoil, the network's Mike Hanna reported that this constituted "a pointed gesture from the United States toward the Israelis that activities within the last week have become virtually indefensible." But Hanna's explanation was at odds with that of U.S. officials. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke said

that the resolution had evoked his "clear distaste," but Secretary of State Albright explained that "vetoing it would have created . . . further problems in the region for us as the honest broker and negotiator."

The most startling ignorance was displayed by CNN's peripatetic Christiane Amanpour, who visited the region and delivered a series of mystifying reports. One day, she described the Israeli Iews who engaged in violence with Israeli Arabs in the town of Nazareth as "settlers," apparently unaware that this term usually refers to Israelis who live in the occupied territories rather than Israel proper (which is why they are called settlers). On another, she described the highly dovish Prime Minister Ehud Barak as if he were from the hawkish end of the Israeli spectrum: "even the supporters of . . . Prime Minister Barak are saying that he's just gone too far this time, that there simply is too much force being used." Conversely, she mistook Hamas for a group of doves: Happening upon an anti-Arafat protest of theirs, she explained that they were upset about "the killings and the casualties."

Despite such instances, the larger reason for the slant against Israel was the contrasting nature of the Israeli and Palestinian regimes—and the failure of the press to cope with the disparity. This took three forms.

First, much investigative information embarrassing to Israel—about illegal settlements, violation of Arabrights, official misconduct, and the like—originates in the Israeli press, which is vibrant and often adversarial. There is, however, no comparable illumination of the warts on the other side. As Palestinian journalist Khaled Abu Toameh put it: "The PA exerts complete control over the media inside the territories."

Second, the Palestinian Authority routinely uses violence and the threat of violence against journalists. Immediately after 9/11, the PA's cabinet secretary called news agencies, warning, as *USA Today* reported, that "the safe-

ty of their staff could not be guaranteed unless they withdrew the embarrassing footage of Palestinian police firing joyfully in the air." When grisly scenes of the lynching of two Israeli reservists in the Ramallah police station was aired despite the effort of PA toughs to confiscate all film of the event, a correspondent for Italy's RAI television rushed to establish that his network was not the source. "We always respect . . . the journalistic procedures [of] the Palestinian Authority," swore Riccardo Cristiano in a groveling letter. "Be assured we would never do such a thing." When Cristiano's letter was published by a Palestinian newspaper, the RAI brass were embarrassed and recalled him, but his colleagues expressed sympathy. One had received a death threat over the Ramallah tape, and Cristiano, they explained, had already been beaten badly in another incident.

Finally, there is an extreme disparity in veracity. Israeli spokesmen, like other Westerners, spin but rarely lie outright, knowing that a steep price would be exacted if they got caught. Trying to be truthful, Israelis sometimes even err to their own disadvantage. On the third day of the violence in the fall of 2000, 12-year-old Mohammed al-Dura was shot dead in his father's arms while cowering behind a barrel and became the poster child of the intifada. At first, the American outlets, except (surprise) ABC, reported noncommittally that the lad had died in a crossfire. But then Israeli spokesmen acknowledged probable responsibility, and thereafter reports said the death was caused by Israeli fire. Months later, after a painstaking probe, the Israelis concluded that the fatal shots likely came from Palestinian guns (a conclusion also reached by an investigative team from the German television network, ARD).

Similarly, Palestinian claims of a "massacre" in Jenin were reinforced by an off-the-cuff estimate by an Israeli military spokesman that the number of dead was perhaps 200. In the end, the Israelis, as well as a U.N. investigation, found that 52 Palestini-

ans had died in Jenin, of whom some 14 to 20 may have been civilians.

Palestinian spokesmen, in contrast, lie shamelessly. Arafat claimed to have ordered a "very serious investigation" of the Ramallah lynching. Palestinian spokesmen heatedly denied knowledge of the arms ship Karine-A. They all claimed a "massacre" had occurred in Ienin: Saeb Erekat estimated the death toll at between 500 and 1,500. Arafat at various times claimed massacres in a half dozen other West Bank towns. PA spokesmen described the "reconstruction" of an ancient synagogue that had been set on fire in Jericho. (It was turned into a mosque.) All of these claims, and many more, were sheer nonsense.

American news organizations have general rules of balance that tell them to report both sides of a story. But how is this to be achieved? Some journalists contented themselves with formulating mindless equations, as when the New York Times's Jane Perlez wrote: "Mr. Sharon's provocative visit to Muslim holy sites atop Ierusalem's Old City, the destruction of the Jewish shrine known as Joseph's tomb . . . and the burning of an ancient synagogue . . . have challenged the very notion of respect for and sovereignty over religious sites." She was referring to Sharon's stroll around the Temple Mount, the third holiest site in Islam, which also happens to be probably the holiest site in Judaism. Was this visit really akin to torching a synagogue and destroying a biblical shrine?

Tortured parallels aside, the goal of balance cannot be achieved by a mechanical report of "he said, she said" when the two sides are so disparate in their fidelity to truth, the openness of their societies, and their willingness to resort to intimidation. A few journalists with long experience in the region consistently presented both sides of the intifada story: NBC's Martin Fletcher was best. But absent especially insightful or knowledgeable individuals, are there no techniques or canons of journalism that will avoid giving a tyranny the upper hand in the press when it takes on a democracy?

China's Imperial Dreams

The strategic importance of Taiwan. BY HISAHIKO OKAZAKI

MERICA MAY NOT KNOW IT, but it has a Taiwan problem. No, the problem isn't that Taipei might declare independence and prompt a cross-strait crisis. Rather, it's that American policymakers fail to recognize the many strategic and regional advantages of keeping Taiwan free of Beijing's political and military control.

If China acquired Taiwan, whether by peaceful or violent means, it would have enormous consequences for the destiny of nations throughout the Pacific Rim, for American influence in the region, and for the promotion of democratic governance in Asia more generally.

China would gain at least one major military benefit. Today, geography constrains Chinese naval operations. Because China lacks ready access to deep waters—particularly on its East China Sea coastline where its major naval bases are located—its submarines are generally forced to sail on the surface for a considerable distance before coming into deep ocean near the Ryukyu archipelago. Such lengthy surface exposure makes the subs vulnerable and, as a result, reduces the threat they pose to other navies. In contrast, Taiwan's east coast borders some of the deepest seas in the Pacific. If China controlled Taiwan, Taiwan-based Chinese submarines would be free to operate throughout the Western Pacific without having to run the extended shallows of the East China Sea.

A Taiwan controlled by Beijing would also pose a threat to the sea

Hisahiko Okazaki is director of the Okazaki Institute in Tokyo, Japan. lanes passing through the South China Sea. China already claims extensive territorial waters in the area. Possession of Taiwan would give de facto control of the northern entrance to the South China Sea to China and allow it to transform a large part of the sea into a kind of Chinese "inner waters." If China claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the sea lanes in this region, the only safe shipping route in Asia in an emergency would be passage through the Lombok Strait in Indonesia and along the east coast of the Philippines.

The implications of China's being able to impose a naval chokehold, or merely to harass commercial vessels, would be immense. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei have no access to the open ocean except through the South China Sea. The same holds for most Thai and Malaysian ports. Obviously, these countries depend on unimpeded access to the South China Sea so they can easily export goods, expand their economies, and maintain political stability. But this dependence makes them highly vulnerable to foreign intimidation. Control of the sea lanes would be a powerful tool for Chinese officials to hold over the heads of Southeast Asian governments, who'd be pressured to adopt pro-Beijing policies or, at the very least, neutral ones. Call it the Finlandization of Southeast Asia.

Nor should one forget the large Chinese communities now living in various Southeast Asian countries. At present, ethnic Chinese populations, whom China typically calls "Overseas Chinese," are divided into three camps: pro-Beijing, pro-Taiwan, and apolitical. Southeast Asian govern-

ments have long exploited these divisions—pitting one camp against the other—to keep their Chinese minorities politically weak. And Beijing, although sometimes noisy in defense of "overseas Chinese," has generally been cautious in intervening on their behalf. But should China absorb Taiwan-even under an interim arrangement of "one state-two systems"these divisions would be replaced by a generally unified Chinese community. There is no question that Beijing would use this domestic constituency to try to influence the policies of their national governments.

For example, in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese play a very prominent role in the economy. With more support from China, they could gain commensurate political power. Similarly,

Moving? Let us know your new address. Go to weeklystandard.com and click on Subscribers Only. Then enter our **Subscriber Services** department. We'll follow you! Standard

in Malaysia, China might show more sympathy toward the local Chinese, who have always complained of racism by the government.

Then there is prosperous and generally pro-Western Singapore, a predominantly ethnic Chinese city-state surrounded by Malay peoples. Though it has made occasional pro-Chinese gestures in a bow to racial and geopolitical realities, Singapore's government has been cautious not to move too far in this direction. But if Beijing's control extended to the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, Singapore would likely find it difficult not to show a decidedly more pro-Beijing face. With that, Chinese control of the South China Sea would be complete, anchored by Taiwan in the north and Singapore in the south.

Finally, any scenario in which China gains control of Taiwan, whatever the reason, would be perceived by states in the region as a sign of American impotence. America's credibility in the region would disappear.

By 1965, many Southeast Asian nations were more or less resigned to eventual Communist dominance of the region. But early that year, the first U.S. ground combat forces landed in South Vietnam. Although the U.S. campaign in Vietnam eventually failed, America's actions on behalf of Saigon gave neighboring countries the courage and time to defeat their own Communist challenges. In September 1965, for example, the Communist coup in Indonesia failed, and in 1967 Southeast Asian nations formed ASEAN to thwart Communist expansion. America's intervention nearly 40 years ago formed the very foundation that supports the stability and prosperity experienced today in much of Southeast Asia. It would be tragic if now, for lack of firmness on America's part, that foundation were undone by too cavalier an assessment of China's designs on Taiwan.

Of course, not everyone is convinced of the threat posed by China to the international order. Those who deny the threat usually say it will be decades before the Chinese can

match the economic and military power of the United States. But this would clearly not be the case if the geopolitical map were suddenly redrawn. And if China acquired Taiwan, the map would be transformed virtually overnight.

Gaining control of Taiwan would also change, psychologically speaking, how the Chinese view the regional map. The Chinese believe they have been the greatest land power over the past thousand years. In modern times, however, China has seen its sway in Asia significantly reduced. The Russians took Siberia. West European powers governed South and Southeast Asia. And Japan and the United States controlled China's access to the Pacific by colonizing Taiwan and the Philippines, respectively. These historical grievances all remain fresh in the minds of the Chinese, and so the annexation of Taiwan, coming on the heels of the return of Hong Kong, would not calm but further inflame Beijing's imperial ambitions.

Why this goes unappreciated in Washington is not hard to fathom. For the great majority of American policymakers and strategists working on Asia, the guiding principle with respect to Taiwan is that Washington must not harm relations with China. This deferential posture gives Beijing great power over Washington's actions regarding Taiwan. dynamic works like this: Because mainland China considers supremely important for Taiwan to be absorbed into one China, Washington obsesses over the process of unification while ignoring the strategic consequences.

Not long ago, an American scholar asked if the United States should care whether Taiwan becomes part of one China. For their part, American policymakers seem to wish unification would hurry up and happen already, if only to simplify their dealings with mainland China. But serious consideration of American interests and those of China's regional neighbors would lead one to wish for just the opposite.

United Europe

It probably isn't in Europe's interest. It certainly isn't in America's.

By Gerard Baker

merica wasn't the only country attempting a bit of nation-building this turbulent summer. While U.S. troops and U.N. diplomats battled insurgents in the streets and deserts of Iraq, European politicians and bureaucrats, in the less demanding surroundings of Brussels bistros and Provencal villas, were putting the finishing touches on a project that might prove every bit as consequential as the liberation of Baghdad.

Next month the Europeans will attempt to mop up the last remnants of opposition to a proposed new constitution for the European Union, the first ever codification of a supreme legal authority for the current 15 and soonto-be 25 members. For two years, in a conscious effort to emulate the work of America's Founding Fathers, committed Europeans, under the leadership of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, have been at work in a constitutional convention to draw up a document that would establish a new relationship between their nations. In June these soi-disant successors to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton produced a draft constitution that seeks to construct in effect the basic institutions of a single European superstate. In October, member governments will begin a lengthy conference before deciding whether to approve the document.

Of course, to skeptical electorates in the member countries, the federalists strenuously deny that they are building a European über-nation. It is merely a tidying-up exercise, they say; European law already supersedes the laws of individual European nations in a number of fields. The new constitution simply recognizes this in one document.

This is pure casuistry. The draft E.U. constitution—

1,000 pages long (imagine that debate in Philadelphia)—

Gerard Baker is associate editor of the Financial Times.

enshrines in law a single flag, anthem, motto, and currency for the union. Less symbolically but more significantly, it also creates a single president to replace the current arrangement whereby the presidency rotates through the member states every six months, as well as a single foreign minister to run a single foreign policy. It establishes vast areas of European law where nation-states cede ultimate legal sovereignty to E.U. courts. And it creates a "charter of fundamental rights," which includes a long list of such basic human freedoms as the right to be represented on workers' councils-think Bill of Rights in socialist garb. Indeed the true intent of these founding fathers was revealed by their original proposal right at the outset of their proposed constitution—to rename the E.U. the United States of Europe (USE).

Not all governments are happy with these ideas—the USE moniker did not survive, and the drafters will probably be forced to drop some of their more ambitious proposals. But these will be mere tactical retreats. This week, even Tony Blair's British government made clear it would accept the basic principles. The constitution is expected to be approved at a summit in Rome in December and then ratified by the member states. By the end of 2005, the E.U. constitution will join the euro—Europe's single currency, launched four years ago—as a central pillar of an emerging European state.

Americans can be forgiven for yawning at these developments on the old continent. The internal deliberations of Brussels committees can send the most engaged Europeans to sleep, let alone Americans. But even those Americans who are paid to keep track of what Europe is up to—at the State Department, in Washington's think tanks, and in the White House—do not seem unduly animated. The new European Union that is being born is nothing for the United States to get agitated about, they say. Indeed, from President Bush on down, U.S. officials repeat the old line that European integration will bring untold benefits to the United States. Future Henry

September 22, 2003 THE WEEKLY STANDARD / 23 Kissingers will never again have to complain about whom to call when they want to talk to Europe.

If this complacency becomes official U.S. policy, it will be folly of the highest order. The events of the last year should have demonstrated the risks for the United States inherent in a united Europe.

The new Europe in the making is not the New Europe Donald Rumsfeld hailed in the run-up to the Iraq war—an alliance of Atlanticist nations like Britain, Spain, and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe. It is likely to bear a much closer resemblance to the Old Europe of Gaullist stripe, defining itself as a self-appointed counterweight to U.S. power; Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder are likely to be the main drivers of its political direction.

alm down, say Europe's supporters in America. There are many reasons why the United States should not get agitated at events across the Atlantic. For starters, there is the "It will never happen, so why worry?" argument. Whatever the ambitions of the Gaullist superstaters at the heart of Europe, haven't the events of this year revealed that the continent is simply too divided to have a meaningful European foreign policy identity?

It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent much of the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the tussle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united Europe?

But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the bicycle theory—if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off—and they have no intention of falling off.

In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge, and the design for the new euro was unveiled.

There is a powerful dynamic at the heart of the E.U.

that tilts the whole process strongly towards closer integration—and towards a particular sort of integration. It is a bargain between Germany, the most federalist country, and France, which supports European union on French terms, together with smaller countries such as Belgium that see an opportunity to punch way above their weight in international affairs if Europe is united.

These countries are now eagerly pressing ahead with an embryonic E.U. security policy, formed around a Franco-Belgian-German core. In neither France nor Germany is there any talk of reorienting policy post-Iraq towards Atlantic cooperation. Indeed, they take seriously Jacques Chirac's notion of a new world in which Europe balances the United States.

Very well, say the doubters, but surely Iraq showed a new arithmetic at work—one basically favorable to the United States. Whatever the Franco-German dreams, European integration will be good for Americans because, thanks to Tony Blair's Britain, Jose Maria Aznar's Spain, and the entry next year of Eastern European countries, the E.U. is moving in our direction.

This is one of the most enduring and dangerous myths about Europe, one sadly fostered by successive British prime ministers, including Blair. If only Britain would put itself at the "heart of Europe," it goes, Britain would lead it. This has never happened. Which is hardly surprising. It is no accident that the countries that have resisted most European moves towards integration have been the least influential. In Europe, as in life, if you pay, you play. The Franco-German axis, together with the deracinated, committed Europeanists who make up the bureaucracy in Brussels, will always win this game.

As for the role of the new Eastern European members, optimism about their influence is misplaced. Once inside the E.U., which has powerful economic leverage over small, relatively poor countries, the magnetic pull of Brussels overwhelms all. When in April the United States offered Poland a sector to control in Iraq, the reaction in official Europe was vicious. "One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to America," warned Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission.

All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows, thanks to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really interested in exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on America's ability to execute its intentions? As one conservative puts it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through Paris?"

This "Europeans as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right. The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to

turn itself into a single state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The Europeans are not multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a single nation—with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand design to take on the United States in some new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do believe in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check.

Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imagine a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin America or Africa.

And one other longstanding goal of U.S. policy could also make European awkwardness more of a constraint for America. It has long been an axiom of U.S. policy that Europe should develop military capabilities of its own—genuine ones that would enable Europe to fight hot wars in difficult places and take some of the burden off the Americans. This too has always been dubious policy. If a united Europe really does develop enhanced capabilities, it is inconceivable that it will not demand a bigger say in the decision-making in new international crises.

Finally, there are those who accept all these premises, but still say, What can the United States do about it? U.S. intervention in a private debate won't help—and will probably make matters worse. The one thing that would make Europeans more determined to press ahead with their project is the idea that the United States was trying to stop it.

But this does not mean Washington is powerless. It can do a number of useful things. Above all, it can stop spouting the outdated Cold War idea that an integrated Europe is in the best interests of the United States. Can anyone now seriously believe that a single E.U. foreign policy will be more helpful to the United States than a British, a Polish, and a Spanish one?

Second, it should strengthen its political and military ties with Eastern Europeans. Moving troops out of Germany to Bulgaria, Romania, and perhaps other countries is a smart move, as was offering the Poles a leading role in postwar Iraq.

Third, it should temper its enthusiasm for the development of stronger European military capabilities. Fran-

co-German-Belgian-Luxembourg plans for a core E.U. military alliance can easily be laughed off. But in these testing times, the United States should be extra careful about a separate European identity within NATO.

Fourth, it should oppose any plans to change the membership of multilateral institutions to reflect a single "European" identity. There should be no talk of a U.N. Security Council seat for Europe, or the creation of a United States-Japan-Europe Group of Three in international economics to replace the G7.

Fifth, it should refrain from doing anything that might help push Britain into the euro. Nothing would represent a more fateful step for European integration than Britain's joining this ill-starred project. U.S. officials sometimes argue that the U.K.'s membership in the single currency would help American businesses. There is scant evidence for this, and the impetus such a British decision would give to European superstatehood cannot be overstated.

In the end, U.S. policymakers should know that the biggest threat posed for the United States by European ambitions comes from inside Europe. Most ordinary Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has already been handed over to Brussels. The dynamic of European integration is not a popular one, but one driven by political elites, and there is already evidence of mounting unease among the general public. The euro, the biggest leap yet towards European statehood—and the monetary and fiscal policies required to make it work—are causing real stresses for Europeans.

There are signs of broader political unrest—of a growing mood of popular disenfranchisement, with increasing support for extreme-right parties in France, Italy, Germany, and even Britain, as voters react with irritation to the growing gap between the governing institutions and the governed. In the last three years, voters in Ireland and Denmark have rejected grandiose E.U. integration plans in referendums. Polls going into Sweden's September 14 referendum on joining the euro suggest the Swedes could deliver another rebuke to the Euro-federalists.

But still the European creators press on, continuing to shift power away from communities, regions, and nations in favor of the emerging supernation in Brussels.

This is the ultimate irony. The Europeanists see themselves as latter-day Thomas Jeffersons and George Washingtons, creating a new state and a new continental global power. But they are closer in spirit to George III and General Cornwallis—imposing a remote, burdensome, and ultimately undemocratic authority on a reluctant people. The risks for stability in Europe are obvious. It is not too late for the United States to help stop the European superstate from becoming a reality.

Premature Iraqification

Why creating a legitimate Iraqi government and security force can't be done overnight

By Reuel Marc Gerecht

hough far from fine-tuned, the Bush administration has finally developed an exit strategy for Iraq. The strategy has two prongs. Through the State Department, the administration will seek to "internationalize" the forces of occupation by obtaining a new U.N. Security Council resolution that would "authorize" Turks, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Moroccans, Indians, and even the French to send their troops. Concurrently through the Defense Department, it will strive to create larger all-Iraqi police and military forces that can work together with—and ideally replace—American soldiers who battle former Baathists, militant Sunni fundamentalists, and foreign iihadists.

The approaches are complementary and separable: No matter what happens in the Security Council, the Pentagon will increasingly hand off internal security to the natives, sooner rather than later. Where only two or three months ago Ambassador Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad foresaw a distinctly gradual transfer of political and military authority to Iraqis, the time frame and the order of that transition are now blurred. The political process was to have preceded and determined the creation of police, paramilitary, and military forces. Now, with a sense of urgency provoked by the August bombings at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad and at a mosque in Najaf, the administration is stressing the "Iraqification" of internal security as a means of diminishing the American casualty rate and the terrorist-guerrilla activity in the central Sunni Arab lands of Iraq. As the chief of the U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, pithily put it, we've got to "do a lot more to bring an Iraqi face to the security establishments throughout Iraq very quickly."

Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Unlike the U.N.-internationalist argument, the all-Iraq approach is morally compelling. There is something unsettling about wanting to have foreign soldiers come die in Iraq in lieu of Americans, which is, if we are to be brutally honest, what many U.S. officials and, it appears, all the Democratic presidential candidates are asking for. The bombing of the U.N. headquarters drove home what should have been obvious: The forces that are killing American soldiers and their Iraqi allies will also gladly kill foreigners, be they European, Arab, or Latin American. As Senator John McCain remarked in a recent hearing, "So . . . we're going to ask for international troops to come in . . . and we'll tell them they'll take casualties, [but] Americans won't take the casualties. I don't get the logic there." To his credit, McCain has been the only voice in the U.S. government to have demurred at this kind of "burden sharing." This is, of course, the post-Vietnam mentality that Osama bin Laden so trenchantly mocked. By contrast, for Iraqis to die in lieu of Americans to ensure their country's freedom from Baathists and Islamic holy warriors does make moral sense. Ultimately, only the Iraqis can create a functioning democracy in their homeland.

Yet "Iraqification," as it may soon be advanced by the Bush administration, isn't likely to solve Iraq's most pressing problems. Indeed, if the Pentagon and the Coalition Provisional Authority move too expeditiously, they may well repeat the great sin of modern Iraqi history by creating security forces before the political system can absorb, socialize, and politically neutralize them. If the United States moves too quickly to rebuild an Iraqi army designed primarily to root out former Baathists, Sunni militants, and jihadists, it could unintentionally reinstall the structure and ethos of the pre-Baath Iraqi army, whose primary mission from its inception was to confront internal, not external, threats. The pre-Baath army—contrary to the public reminiscences of the former military officers in the opposition groups paid for by the

Central Intelligence Agency—was a predatory institution that consistently defined its interests as the nation's.

In moving hastily, the administration could be tempted to draw significantly from the former Sunni Arab military officer corps, the Sunni Arab rank and file, and the few Shiite Arab officers who had risen to senior positions in Saddam Hussein's completely politicized army. Unintentionally, the administration could transgress a red line with Iraq's Shiite clergy, who are closely watching how America handles the reconstitution of Iraq's security forces. It was the army, in Sunni Arab hands, and the British that denied the Shiites their rightful predominance in the country's first parliament after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Without the army, Iraq's succession of dictators could never have destroyed its once vibrant culture.

It bears repeating: Any action by the Coalition Provisional Authority that fundamentally compromises its relationship with the Shiite clergy is unwise. Whatever trouble the Bush administration thinks it is currently having in Iraq, it will look back wistfully to this time if the Shiites go into opposition. The bombings in Najaf have already partially reactivated the Badr Brigade, the Iranian-created

paramilitary force behind the slain Shiite leader, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim. If there are any more major bombings in the Shiite south, especially in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, the Badr Brigade will unquestionably become a permanent, active component of the Shiite landscape. So far, the Badr, along with the rest of the Shiite community, have reacted to al-Hakim's death and the attempted assassination of his nephew, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim, with equanimity. However, if the Coalition Provisional Authority missteps in the eyes of the Shiites in its rebuilding of Iraq's internal security forces, a collision with the Badr corps is by no means unthinkable. Indeed, the Authority should be prepared to preempt such possible hostility by trying to incorporate units of the Badr into any new Iraqi army.

Obviously, enormous care must be taken in building Iraq's future armed forces: This is easily the most critical task confronting the Bush administration. The finest decision of Ambassador Bremer in Iraq was to retire the remnants of the old, Sunni-dominated military. The retention of that force could have put us hopelessly at odds with the Shiites and Kurds, who are at least 80 percent of Iraq's population. However badly the U.S. military wants to

THE	Pub l	lic
11	ere	st

"Simply the nation's best domestic policy journal."

— David Brooks

FALL 2003

What Was Leo Strauss Up To? Steven Lenzner & William Kristol

Michael S. Teitelbaum on the scientist "shortage"

Kay S. Hymowitz on abstinence education * Yuval Levin on the two cultures

James Q. Wilson & Karlyn Bowman on America's "peace party"

Isabel V. Sawhill on behavior and poverty * Michael Warner on the new geopolitics

Book reviews by William A. Galston, Chaudia Winkler, Harry Siegel, W. Bradford Wilcox, Jason Bertsch, and Eli Lehrer

Name		To subscribe end 8886	C67-6030
Voidness		Or write to us of: 1112 Park Sirver, N.W., Sube 146 Windington, D.C., 20036	
	Subscriptions: \$25,00 per year (4) issue	gs), \$47.50 for two years	W \$503

share the burden in Iraq, it would be an egregious mistake to have a functioning Iraqi army before the Iraqi people have a constitution, to which Iraqi soldiers must swear their allegiance. Indeed, this is the yardstick by which we can best gauge whether Defense, panicked by the bombs of August, has become its own worst enemy.

Until recently, the bright minds in the Coalition Provisional Authority knew that the United States would be welcome in Iraq for no more than two or three years. After that, the Shiites, led by their very nationalist clergy, would likely declare the Americans defunct, no longer helpful to their political aspirations, which appear to be democratic. The authority's old birthing schedule—a constitutional convention within a year, a constitution within 18 months, national elections within 24—was a rough but sensible outline, which was to be shortened or lengthened depending on how much initiative the Iraqis displayed and how much encouragement the Americans gave them. Considering the tone and commentary now coming from the Pentagon, one has to wonder whether this outline has been jettisoned and replaced by a very loose slide rule that measures the maturity of Iraqi constitutionalism primarily by the American body count.

The sociology and politics of constructing a new Iraqi army aside, it also isn't clear that bigger internal Iraqi security forces are key to thwarting the terror-cum-guerrilla attacks of the former Baathists, Wahhabi fundamentalists, and foreign Sunni holy warriors coming over the Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi borders. It is certainly true that better Iraqi-generated intelligence about the whereabouts of these forces would greatly aid the coalition's efforts to destroy them. But it's not immediately evident why increasing the number of Iraqis under arms from approximately 50,000—the current level according to the Pentagon—to, say, 75,000 or 100,000 in the next year is going to make a decisive difference, unless the additional numbers come from the regions where the Baathists, fundamentalists, and jihadists are thriving.

It would be interesting to know, of the 50,000-plus Iraqis under arms (an impressive number given that the war ended in April), how many come from the Sunni/Baathist strongholds of Ramadi and Tikrit. In all probability, the numbers there aren't large. The advantage of "all-Iraqi" security forces in these towns, where popular sentiment definitely seems to be nostalgic for the rule of Sunnis, the Sunni-dominated Baath, or both, would be in such forces' ability to sleuth out the whereabouts of the guerrillas and terrorists and their most operationally critical sympathizers. Sending more non-Ramadi and non-Tikriti Iraqi security officials into these towns might conceivably spur the patriotism of the hard-core denizens who have become guerrillas-cum-terrorists and their key

supporters, but it doesn't seem likely. These pro-Saddam and militant Sunni fighters are playing for keeps. An Iraqi face on security doesn't appear likely to make them less inclined to kill Iraqis, Americans, or other foreigners. These men know their world is over unless they down both the Americans and the Iraqis—overwhelmingly Arab Shiites and Kurds—who will inherit power in Uncle Sam's wake. With either the Americans or the Iraqis on the cutting edge of internal security or in control of the national government, the hard-core insurrectionists have to be arrested or killed. One day they might, just possibly, be reeducated (converted Communists and Nazis have existed), but increasing the number of armed Iraqis whom they consider traitors can't accomplish this over the next several months.

And does the Bush administration really want newly constituted Iraqi security forces in the thick of things in the hostile Sunni belt? Any successful national internal security force will have to reflect more or less the composition of the Iraqi population. Do we want to send so soon a force overwhelmingly composed of Shiites and Kurds into Tikrit or Ramadi? If local police in the Sunni regions have so far proved ineffective in penetrating and thwarting homegrown or imported guerrilla and terrorist forces in their regions, it may well be because they lack the will to do so.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested this when he chided Iraqis on his recent visit to their country. "This country belongs to the Iraqi people, and in the last analysis it's the Iraqi people who will provide the security in this country," he said. "Instead of pointing fingers . . . at the security forces of the coalition because there are acts of violence taking place against the Iraqi people, . . . it's important for the Iraqi people to step up and take responsibility for the security by providing information to . . . [the Americans] to a greater extent than they're doing."

Of course, Iraqi Sunnis might not want "to step up" because the Americans did a lackadaisical job of arresting former Baathists after the fall of Baghdad. These Iraqi Sunnis may think that America's "footprint" in their neighborhoods is too light, not too heavy. They might disagree with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz when he recently echoed the sentiments of former New York City police chief Bernie Kerik, who was overseeing the creation of a new national Iraqi police force: ". . . if you triple the number of coalition forces, [per Kerik], 'You'll probably triple the attacks on the troops.'" (According to this logic, the Pentagon ought to have a pint-size force patrolling the heartland of Saddam's power.)

In a post-totalitarian society, it is, of course, quite understandable for even the bravest individuals to fear



Soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division distribute arms to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in Bayji.

coming forward. In Iraq, where Saddam's killers may in many areas control the streets, it's sensible to stay ignorant and keep your head down. It is also possible that a great many Iraqi Sunnis are still spiritually allied with the old Sunni Baath order. If this is true—and this is the worst-case scenario—then the Pentagon is going to have to be much more intrusive than it has so far been. Counter-insurgency wars are ugly and labor intensive.

Yet the Pentagon's contention is undoubtedly true that more Iraqis are needed to aid the coalition forces. "Iraqification" ought to be a question of degree and speed, not kind. Having more anti-Saddam Iraqis directly reaching out to their countrymen would certainly work vastly better than having Kevlar-clad Americans in armored vehicles waiting for tips. The Iraqi National Congress's Ahmad Chalabi was right when he argued long before the war began that America would need Iraqi eyes and ears both attached to and independent of U.S. military forces.

The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency strenuously and successfully fought this plan. Truth be told, the Pentagon, including its civilian leadership, failed to go to the mat to ensure that a large Iraqi expeditionary force was ready by March. It is worth noting, too, that the Sunni-dominated oppositionist groups that the CIA and the State Department liked—most famously the coup-plotting Iraqi National Accord—have, according to Pentagon and CIA officials, so far accom-

plished little to nothing on the ground in Iraq. Whatever influence the Iraqi National Accord had among the Sunni military elite and the Baath party, it's not translated into any intelligence punch on behalf of U.S. soldiers fighting in the Sunni belt. By comparison, the Iraqi National Congress, whatever its faults, has been more successful in its tactical understanding of the post-Saddam battleground.

In any case, the Pentagon's allpurpose refrain that it could succeed if only it had good intelligence is a truism that suggests its offensive tactics may be lacking. On the ground, intelligence, particularly the human kind, is always less than it should be. The CIA has been for decades between mediocre and awful in supplying human intelligence on Iraq. With hard targets like ex-Baathists, Wahhabi fundamentalists, and foreign jihadists of


various stripes, there is no reason to believe that the clandestine service will be any more effective now than in the past.

If the Pentagon really doesn't think the coalition is winning on the ground—and any honest observer who's been to Iraq can certainly make a case that the coalition is doing passably well—then it should switch tactics and stop scolding the Iraqis for their sub-par performance. In the short-term—and given the likely two or three-year maximum mandate the United States will have from the Iraqi people, the short-term is what matters—the battle for hearts and minds in Iraq is for the United States to lose, not for all-Iraqi security forces to win. The latter have an important role to play in securing their country for a freer, democratic future. But we need to be careful not to put the cart before the horse.

The mandate and daily practice of the Iraqi Governing Council, the coming, tempestuous constitutional convention, and the new constitution itself are what ought to preoccupy the Bush administration after the bombs of August. The forging of decent new political institutions should be the means by which we transfer power to the Iraqi people and neutralize the forces that want to destroy a democratic Iraq before it is born. Would that the Pentagon, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the State Department spent more time talking in detail about *that* exit strategy.

REVEALED...The Clintons' plans to make Hillary President!

And ruthlessly destroy any obstacle in her way



Your worst fears may be about to come true.

Hillary's Scheme: Inside the Next Clinton's Ruthless Agenda to Take the White House exposes the Clintons' long-range, highly detailed plan to make Hillary President of the United States – and yes, despite her official denials, she's still mulling over a run in 2004.

In shocking detail, investigative journalist Carl Limbacher here blows the lid off the New York senator's plans for a grand political coup, something she has been carefully and quietly plotting for more than 20 years. With a patience, doggedness, and thirst for the truth that few reporters have displayed, Limbacher got the full story of Hillary's plans by conducting extensive research into Hillary's past and securing exclusive interviews with Clinton insiders. He even questioned Hillary herself! Limbacher uncovers the juicy morsels, backroom deals, and insider wrangling surrounding Hillary's presidential ambitions—the hidden details that the mainstream press is too intimidated by (or enamored of) the Clintons to tell you about.

Think that Hillary doesn't stand a chance to become President? Limbacher shows how they'll get around potential and real scandals of a magnitude and much more....find out when you join the Conservative Book Club!

Benefits of Membership and How the Book Club Works

INSTANT SAVINGS! Join today and get Hillary's Scheme absolutely FREE, plus shipping and handling. Then take up to one year to buy two more books at regular low Club prices (20-50% below retail). After you have paid for your books, your Membership can be ended by you or the Club. Plus you will also get the opportunities to buy from our list of Superbargain books that the Club regularly offers. These books are offered at 70-90% discounts!! (Sorry, Superbargain books don't count toward your book commitment).

SHOP AT HOME CONVENIENCE! Up to 16 times a year you will receive the Club Bulletin packed with the kind of books you will want to read and own. Each Bulletin will describe a Featured Selection chosen just for our Members. Also included are a number of alternate selections about politics, religion, history, home schooling, investing, and other areas of interest to conservatives.

CBC ONLINE! You can now read about and conveniently order CBC books from our website at www.conservativebookclub.com. Same discounts apply, of course. And, with regularly scheduled live chats with our authors and members-only bulletin board, you can keep up with the conservative community on a range of important issues.

100% SATISFACTION GUARANTEED! If you are not completely satisfied with any book, return it and receive a complete credit. Plus you will always have at least ten days to make your decision to receive the Featured Selection. If you ever have less than ten days, you simply return the book at Club expense for a full credit. One Membership per household please.

\checkmark	YES! Please enroll me as a member of the Conservative Book Club under the
	terms outlined in this ad. Send Hillary's Scheme for FREE and bill me just for the
	shipping and handling. I then need to buy only two additional books over the next year at regularly discounted Club prices (20-50% off retail).
	next year at regularly discounted club prices (20-30 % on retail).

	C1191-AZ
Name	
City	
Email	

Fill out this coupon and mail to:

• Prices slightly higher in Canada • Membership subject to approval by the Conservative Book Club



1147 P.O. Box 97196, Washington, DC 20090-7196

6313

Forty-Four Years of Solitude

Cuba Under Castro

By Lauren Weiner

o one knows what is going to happen next in Cuba, but in Cuba, The Morning After: Confronting Castro's Legacy, Mark Falcoff lays out in depressing detail how unlikely any of the possible scenarios are to improve life on that afflicted island. In a book that mixes acceptance and pessimism, Falcoff reviews the political, economic, and social life of Cuba as the seventy-seven-year-old Fidel Castro enters the final stages of his dictatorship.

Falcoff, a distinguished Latin Americanist and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, seems to prefer an end to official hostility between Cuba and the United States. But he knows even that will not soon rescue a society that is desperately poor, unable to revive its best industry (the export of sugar), exhausted by failed projects of agricultural collectivization and nuclear power construction, and degraded by the dictator's control of information and culture.

Falcoff's acceptance of normal relations between the United States and

Lauren Weiner is a writer in Baltimore.



Cuba is a bow to the post-Cold War dynamic that draws the two countries together. The forces of that dynamic include Castro's much-ballyhooed foray into tourism (prompted by the loss of massive subsidies when the Soviet

> Cuba, The Morning After Confronting Castro's Legacy by Mark Falcoff AEI, 279 pp., \$25

Union collapsed), the constitutional recognition of the right of private foreign property in 1992, the circulation of the United States dollar in Cuba since 1993, and incipient business contacts between Havana and some Cuban Americans in Miami, members of a group once reviled by Castro as *gusanos* (worms).

Falcoff, however, is quick to admit skepticism about these ameliorative forces. He notes the tangle of legal claims by individuals and companies who had their property expropriated by the 1959 revolution will vex American and Cuban relations—whether the successor government continues Castro's one-party tyranny or is more open and democratic.

As for the legalization of the American dollar, it has "introduced new and sharp inequalities in Cuban society." The experiments in capitalism are almost entirely run by the military, with ordinary Cubans excluded. Castro's death or incapacitation could bring a popular revolt. Upheaval of this kind "raises the prospect of uncontrolled immigration" to the United States (but then again, so, in

Falcoff's view, does every other scenario, including a peaceful and orderly transition).

Further darkening the picture are the economic statistics Falcoff cites. They indicate that tourism, even at its most successful, will not recoup the lost \$6 billion that Moscow provided to Havana every year. Nor is the lifting of the American embargo, he forecasts, going to bring anything like the bonanza for exporters of rice, wheat, and other commodities that the would-be embargo-lifters (of both the American left and right) promise.

To understand why these things are so, we need to appreciate how much average Cubans have been infantilized by the state for the last forty years. It does not permit them to bargain collectively with an employer, to go on strike, to own a cell phone, or to rent a car. This is a woefully inadequate nanny state that leaves Cubans at once angry and bereft of any work ethic that could help them turn things around. One is tempted to find the book's main message in the statement that post-Castro Cuba may not turn out to have "a political and economic system very much different from the one that presently exists."

Falcoff is a miserabilist on Cuba not just because communism has run the place into the ground, but because of American policy. Quotas on the importation of sugar into the United States hamper Cuba's already low chances of getting its rickety sugar mills to be productive again. Moreover, he argues that our anti-Communist policy favoring the admission of political dissidents from Cuba, though wellmeaning, has been a helpful safety valve for the dictator over the decades since "many who would protest the policies of the Castro government simply opt out and queue up for an exit visa." And, he adds mordantly, some Cubans have managed to get here by merely posing as dissidents.

The author notes with concern the feelers being put out by American military officers to their Cuban counterparts, again with good intentions: to anticipate and prevent an explosion of violence (and boat people) when Cas-

tro goes. He's right that these friendly gestures strengthen the least democratic—and most pervasive and powerful—sector of Cuban life: its military.

The only real certainty is that the transition ahead is not something from which we can turn our gaze. That ninety-mile distance between the north coast of the island and the south-

ern tip of the United States entwines the destinies of the two countries. If the tensions between "a revolutionary history [that] cannot be unlived and a market-oriented future that ultimately cannot be avoided" bring catastrophe for 11.2 million Cubans, America will have no choice but to try to somehow pick up the pieces.



Novel Gods

A pair of bestsellers roll their own religion.

BY CYNTHIA GRENIER

The Da Vinci Code

by Dan Brown Doubleday, 454 pp., \$24.95

The Lovely Bones

A Novel

by Alice Sebold Little Brown, 288pp., \$21.95

o one really expects a bestseller to be a work of much literary quality these days. A bestseller is largely the product of packaging, merchandizing, and manipulation. But one could never have expected the level of manipulation found in a pair of reli-

gious novels that have been selling prodigiously well this past year.

As it happens, the religion in both *The Da Vinci Code* and *The Lovely Bones* comes across as basically godless. Well, in a manner

of speaking. Dan Brown's *The Da Vinci Code* offers us Mary Magdalene (a nice high-born Jewish virgin, please, not the reformed prostitute known by that name), who marries Jesus, bears him children, and then is appointed his successor in the church for ages to come. In short, we are in for a deeply, profoundly feminist view of the Catholic faith. As for Alice Sebold's *The Lovely Bones*, the whole story is told from a feminine point of view and gives us a heaven with no God the Father, let alone his Son seated on His right hand to judge the quick and the dead.

Both books are clearly aimed at female readers, but then women are

Cynthia Grenier is a writer in Washington, D.C.

thought to be the main buyers of fiction in this country and age. It's hard to imagine many male readers responding to either of these novels unless their feminine sensibilities are of a singular sensitivity. Indeed, Dan Brown comes right out with it in the last paragraph of his acknowledgments in *The Da Vinci*

Code: "And, finally, in a novel drawing so heavily on the sacred feminine, I would be remiss if I did not mention the two extraordinary women who have touched my life. First, my mother, Connie

Brown—fellow scribe, nurturer, musician, and role model. And my wife, Blythe—art historian, painter, front-line-editor, and without a doubt the most astonishingly talented woman I have ever known." Men, read at your own peril.

As it happens, the book gets off to a properly masculine opening. Late at night in a gallery in the Louvre in Paris, an aged curator confronts a monstrous pink-eyed albino who demands to know where some secret lies. When the curator refuses to tell, the albino carefully shoots him fatally in the gut. "Pain is good, monsieur," says the albino, slipping away.

Following the page where he blesses his mother and wife on their beneficent influence on his life, Brown presents

his readers with a page headed "FACT" in bold face—where he states that the book's "Priory of Sion" is a real organization, a European secret society founded in 1099 with such members as Isaac Newton, Botticelli, Victor Hugo, and Leonardo da Vinci. He adds that the "Vatican prelature known as Opus Dei is a deeply devout Catholic sect that has been the topic of recent controversy due to reports of brainwashing, coercion, and a dangerous practice known as 'corporeal mortification." He then adds that "the Opus Dei has 8 just completed construction of a \$47 million National 🖥 Headquarters at 243 Lexington Avenue in New York City." He winds up with a § final sentence: "All descriptions of artwork, architecture, documents, and secret rituals in this novel are accurate."

all me a skeptic, but & this I simply do not buy. The rituals he recounts

are a mishmash of an author's reading in various fanciful tales. If you've ever considered the possibility that the Holy Grail sought by King Arthur's knights is really the chalice containing the bones of the True Mother of the Church, then The Da Vinci Code is the book for you. If your imagination has never moved in quite that direction, the book is better skipped: You're not likely to be moved by the 454-page book's final description of Brown's hero falling to his knees before the three-foot tall pyramid beneath the enormous glass pyramid in the Louvre's courtyard—because he has at last discovered that the Sacred Mary's bones are there.

As for general factual accuracy of detail, let me say if Brown, his mother, his wife, and his editors believe that the Hôtel de Crillon is about a mile from the American Embassy (actually, it's

just across the rue Boissy d'Anglas), lishers to try to pass this gallimaufry off

just across the rue Boissy d'Anglas), they are hardly to be trusted on more complex matters of religious lore. Brown's view of Paris is really quite imaginative. The Carrousel du Louvre was, he writes, "once the site of Paris' primeval nature-worshipping festivals... joyous rites to celebrate fertility and the Goddess." Oh, please. Someone needs to give the man and his editors both a standard history of Christianity and a map.

Brown's earlier novel, Angels and Demons—which features a pope committing suicide in a burst of flames on a balcony in St. Peter's Basilica—shows an equal disregard for historical accuracy and a marked hostility to the Catholic Church. But it has risen high on the paperback-bestseller list this summer, thanks presumably to the success of The Da Vinci Code. It's really very naughty of Brown and his pub-

lishers to try to pass this gallimaufry off simply by sprinkling actual historical names and details here and there.

Meanwhile, this year's other religious bestseller, Alice Sebold's *The Lovely Bones*, has the partial merit of being reasonably well written, a small cut above most pop-thriller fiction. Fourteen-year-old Susie, the narrator, was brutally raped and murdered, but she can stay around Earth, observing and growing up, and even experiencing a wonderful vicarious sexual encounter.

While Susie keeps an eye on her beloved family, she and some other young women who also met untimely ends go to high school in a sort of vague Purgatory, but a nice high school that every teenage female in Sebold's world no doubt dreams of: no schoolbooks, no homework, but lots of pretty



women's fashion magazines to browse through. When Susie finally makes it to Heaven (a fairly nebulous process, incidentally), she declares, in case any of us here on earth might have any doubts: "Heaven is fun." And Susie—not God, as He is nowhere present in this work—deals out punishment herself, finally wreaking vengeance upon her rapist.

There is, it must be said, something frankly obscene about these works offering their jejune comfort in the world as we find it today. Early in the twentieth century, Max Weber regretted a world from which "the ultimate and sublime values" had been withdrawn. Where are those "ultimate and sublime values" today when we need them more than ever?



Out of Kees

The strange life and death of the American poet Weldon Kees. By David Caplan

Vanished Act
The Life and Art of Weldon Kees

by James Reidel

Univ. of Nebraska Press, 398 pp., \$35

hy don't you want to be a success?"
Truman Capote asked Weldon
Kees soon after they met. Not waiting

for a response, Capote added, "I can tell from the way you act you don't want to be a success.... Why, you're a much better poet than

old Robert Lowell."

Born in 1914, Kees belonged to a famously competitive generation of poets. As James Reidel notes in his

David Caplan teaches English at Ohio Wesleyan University.

painstaking biography Vanished Act: The Life and Art of Weldon Kees, Kees viewed success ambivalently, seeking "some gray area between neglect and fame." The fact that Kees wrote a

friend about his encounter with Capote suggests that Capote knew the right way to flatter the poet: by appealing to Kees's

sense that he was above such flattery.

Kees makes a great subject for a biography because he knew everyone. A poet, novelist, painter, and critic, he enjoyed a circle of acquaintances from James Agee and Whittaker Chambers (who canned him as *Time*'s film

reviewer because "our readers don't like to hear you groan") to Lily Ayer, a Bay-area stripper who read T.S. Eliot's "The Waste Land" at one of the "Poets' Follies" that Kees organized. On the air at Berkeley's KPFA radio station, Kees talked movies with a young Pauline Kael; back East he swapped gossip over old-fashioneds with Edmund Wilson and Mary McCarthy.

Vanished Act lucidly examines Kees's heartbreaking life. (Despite the subtitle, Kees's actual art receives less attention and almost no substantive analysis in the book.) Born in Beatrice, Nebraska, to a family that owned a successful hardware-manufacturing business, Kees attended several Midwestern colleges. Soon after graduation he married the only woman he had ever dated and began unsuccessfully pursuing several careers, often at the same time. He worked as a librarian in Denver, a film reviewer in New York, a painter and cultural organizer in Provincetown, and an artist-of-alltrades and researcher in San Francisco. Like her husband, Ann Kees was a hard drinker and suffered from depression; their marriage ended in divorce.

In 1955 Kees disappeared. His car was found parked by the Golden Gate Bridge, with the keys left in the ignition. Though Kees had often spoken of suicide, mentioning a desire to jump off the bridge, rumors persisted that he had fled to Mexico. Adding an air of melodrama, *Vanished Act* devotes its opening and closing chapters to the disappearance.

The introduction declares that the case of Kees's disappearance "is closed and long has been." This statement's decisiveness contrasts with the rest of the book's hedging. "It is not possible to know his thoughts," Reidel writes of Kees's drive to the bridge. That's certainly true, but only twenty-five pages before, Reidel recounts Kees's thoughts as he flew across California. In fact the biographer somehow gains access to his subject's most intimate calculations, reporting on the particular women whom the poet considered pursuing. ("Maybe a new girlfriend

would be a healthy change.... Mentally he pictured prospects: Interplayer actresses, women at Langley Porter, Ketty.") To allow an interested reader to check the author's conclusions against the evidence, *Vanished Act* needs far more endnotes than the fifteen it offers.

In addition to poetry, Kees's diffuse body of work includes jazz songs, literary criticism, movie reviews, a novel, screenplays, and a coauthored book on behavioral science. But Kees's artistic career suffered from bad timing and a series of near misses. Clement Greenberg almost reviewed his painting exhibition, which Greenberg called "terrific"; several top publishing houses almost accepted Kees's novel, Fall Quarter, but the outbreak of World War II made the academic farce seem dated. (In 1990 Story Line Press published Fall Quarter posthumously, with an introduction by Reidel.) Kees never enjoyed an academic position, let alone the security that tenure affords, and never traveled abroad, with or without a Guggenheim. Much of Vanished Act is a record of Kees's wearving efforts to scrape together enough money to live; only months before his disappearance he was forced to ask his parents for another modest handout.

Despite such difficulties, Kees's work attracted a devoted following. Contemporaries as different as William Carlos Williams and Allen Tate praised his poetry. A ghoulish delight in decline and fall inspired that poetry. ("Spengler is such fun," he once remarked.) Dylan Thomas revived the villanelle by using it to exhort his father to rage, rage against the dying of the light. Kees used the same form to witness an eerie collapse. A crack is moving down the wall. | Defective plaster isn't all the cause. / We must remain until the roof falls in, he wrote. Kees's flatly worded observation of decay intensifies into a rallying cry, a determination to watch (in another poem's description) as A planet surges, plunging, and goes out.

The poem "Crime Club" portrays a detective driven incurably insane by a case he cannot solve: Screaming that all the world is mad, that clues / Lead nowhere, or to walls so high that their tops



cannot be seen; / Screaming all day of war, screaming that nothing can be solved. The mad detective shares Kees's tragic view of life; that human existence is a bleak, unsolvable riddle. Elusive and un-

equivocal, the final image also suggests how such hopelessness remains ultimately impenetrable, even for a biographer as knowledgeable about his subject as Reidel.



Sufi Surfing

Pico Iyer and the Californization of mystical Islam.

BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

Abandon by Pico Iyer

Knopf, 360 pp., \$24

ico Iyer, who mainly works as a writer for *Time*, comes to the topic of Sufism after a series of books that seem unlikely preparation. His *Video Night in Kathmandu*, *Falling Off the Map*, and *The*

Global Soul glittered with the bright lights and Time-reporter sorts of insights about a homogenized, post-

postmodern, globalized world. He produced a novel, *Cuba and the Night*, which showed a desperate need to find a place—even if it happened to be a

A frequent contributor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Stephen Schwartz is author of The Two Faces of Islam.

brutal Communist dictatorship—unsullied by commercialization, uniformity, and standardization.

Now, in his latest novel, *Abandon*, he has turned inward, ostensibly to an exploration of the Islamic mystical tra-

dition called Sufism in search of an alternative to a globalized world. Strangely, the location for his inward search is

California, the capital of ultimate banality. One would like to explain this away as a deep Sufi parable, but, a travel writer, Iyer's approach to Sufism remains that of a tourist among tourists. His Sufism is a marketable mysticism, reduced to small bites of tranquility and enlightenment.



"Sufi Sam" (Samuel Lewis), the father of California Sufism, in 1969.

The novel's protagonist, John Macmillan, is an English graduate student of unreported age and appearance. He meets with professors, attends seminars, and encounters a troubled woman, Camilla-a name Latin in origin, but a homonym of the Arabic name Kamila meaning "perfect" which is not mentioned in the narrative. He is shown obscure manuscripts (of which we learn nothing) by some Los Angeles Iranians and a Muslim in India. Finally, he obtains a manuscript of verse that, somewhat inexplicably, excites him. Interspersed with these episodes, and the enervated consequences that flow from them, are trips to places like Damascus, Seville, and the cities of Iran, that should be, but somehow are not, vivid-in order

to meet individuals who should be, but somehow are not, insightful.

Macmillan also drives around California in a kind of Raymond Chandler reverie, but without gangsters, detectives, or blood. Bloodlessness is, indeed, the operating description of Iyer's Abandon: an empty landscape of happenings where nothing happens. Aside from Macmillan's dully enigmatic and petulant mentor, Sefhadi, the book's experts talk about research without describing it, express an overdramatized amour propre, and lecture in New Age generalities. Macmillan's affair with Camilla is formalized and barely complicated, described with an oddly inept vocabulary about sex ("when he met her there, she let out a great cry, and then began sobbing").

In the pages of *Abandon*, there are no real Sufis, only academic experts or weekend Sufis. For instance, dhikr (the central Sufi ritual of remembrance of God) is absent, as are the names of the dervish orders. Everything in the novel seems exhausted; and there is no self-awareness that would lift such unappetizing porridge to the level one might expect from a novel touching, even marginally, on the chaos and controversy with which, for instance, contemporary Iran is associated. One would never imagine, reading this story, that real Sufis are surprisingly easy to find in the United States. Nor would one learn, from this book, that the Sufi classics crackle with energy and verve.

Spiritual odysseys do, in fact, beckon us today. But to embark upon them requires something more than lackluster campus colloquia about Rumi. My own real engagement with Sufism came at age forty-four, when I came across a volume by Baba Rexheb Beqiri, who established an Albanian Sufi presence in Michigan, entitled The Mysticism of Islam and Bektashism.

Then, in Kosovo, I met genuine Sufis, committed to a life and death struggle for the survival of their communities in the face of Serbian aggression. On July 19, 1998, for instance, the first pitched battle between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army took place in the town of Rahovec. Open fighting in the streets culminated in a Serb assault on the Helveti-Karabashi Sufi shrine in the town, in which hundreds of terrified residents had gathered. The elderly and distinguished leader of the community, Sheikh Myhedin Shehu, was killed, and up to a hundred and fifty more Albanians died. Serb paramilitaries also committed a horrifying massacre in the home and shrine of another Kosovo Sufi, Sheikh Dervishdana. (The Dervishdana incident figures in the indictment of Milosevic at the Hague.)

Through scenes like this, one realizes that not all Sufis, regardless of their reputation as adherents of a peaceful Islam, can be expected to be New Age huggy bears. There are pious and sober Sufis, and rebellious, ecstatic



Sufi leader Baba Rexheb Beqiri greets a Republican congressman.

Sufis. Although most advocate for peace, they do not preach surrender to aggression. Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, leader of the Algerian Muslim struggle against the French a hundred and fifty years ago, was a Sufi who made protection of Christians and Jews his outstanding mission in times of war. The greatest Arab jihad fighter of his time, he wrote that Sufis found participation in jihad the most difficult duty they incurred as Muslims. Until the recent campaign by Saudi agents of the extremist Wahhabi sect to subvert their struggle, the Chechens who fought against Russian imperialism were overwhelmingly members of two famous and combative Sufi orders, the Nagshbandis and Qadiris. Bektashi Sufis were the chaplains for the Ottoman fighting force known as the Janissaries (recruited as children from Christian families).


Yet war is not the only means by which activist Sufism contributes to struggles for freedom. Iyer suggests the subversive elements in Sufism may threaten the present government in Iran; what they threaten, in fact, is Saudi Arabia. Much has been said in praise of the Sufi poet Rumi, but I know nothing more eloquent in celebration of Islamic spiritual traditions than the recollection of the Croatian poet Vlado Gotovac, a dissident who was tortured and threatened with death in Yugoslav Communist prisons.


Gotovac placed Rumi, along with such other Sufis as Suhrawardi and Hallaj, on an equal level with St. Augustine, Holderlin, Melville, Apollinaire, Mandelstam, and others as the master writers of civilization.

All this makes a difference—and makes worrisome Iyer's sort of Califor-

nia tourist Sufism lite-for the Sufis are anything but marginal in the present combat for the soul of Islam. Among America's strongest allies in Iraq are Kurdish and Arab Sufi sheikhs, who are immensely fearful since Saudi-funded Wahhabis have flooded their territory in the aftermath of war, using relief operations as a pretext for religious colonialism. Here at home, no Islamic leader has been more outspoken, in demanding loyalty on the part of American Muslims to the United States and its democratic polity, than Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani of the Nagshbandi Sufis. Unlike the Sufis in Iver's *Abandon*, real dervishes today do not troll exotic locations for rare manuscripts to "liberate." Rather, they restore stolen manuscripts to their rightful owners and rebuild vandalized libraries, as in Iraq and Kosovo.

Iyer's protagonist, John Macmillan, goes to California to study Sufism. In fact, leaving "California Sufism" is the first thing a genuine student should do.





skilled storyteller. Read his book, laugh out loud, and learn a lot about TV, Washington, D.C., and life."

-William Kristol, editor, The Weekly Standard

"Downright hilarious."

-Publishers Weekly

"Entertaining stuff."

—Kirkus Reviews

AVAILABLE IN HARDCOVER

Read an Excerpt Online at www.twbookmark.com

WARNER BOOKS

An AOL Time Warner Book Group Company

The Standard Reader



Albert Einstein discovers that time can be slowed dramatically by standing in line at the Department of Motor Vehicles.

Books in Brief



Hollywood's White House: The American Presidency in Film and History, edited by Peter C. Rollins and John E. O'Connor (Uni-

versity Press of Kentucky, 441 pp., \$32). You may not think *Dick*, the 1999 comedy featuring Dan Hedaya as Richard Nixon, is worth serious academic analysis. But then you read Charlene Etkind's very serious "Richard Nixon as *Dick* and the Comedic Treatment of the Presidency," and you realize—well, that you were right about *Dick*.

Etkind's essay is one of many in Hollywood's White House that examine how the film industry has portrayed real and fictional chief executives over the years. The essays are all strong on academic jargon and weighty generalizations, and weak on insight. It's no surprise to learn, for instance, that "Most men elected to the presidency bring to the office their foibles and peccadillos," and that Dick "serves a restorative purpose, returning to the audience a sense of control and a chance to give the deeds of the past a historical per-

spective." (On second thought, that last one may come as a surprise.)

Readers may be scared away by such titles as "Who's In Charge Here? Technology and the Presidency in *Fail-Safe* and *Colossus*" and "'Biological Business-as-Usual': The Beast in Oliver Stone's *Nixon*." But they needn't worry; the only deepness here is the deep sleep they're likely to induce.

The first half of the collection, which traces Hollywood's various takes on Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt, et al., is a little more readable, if only because the pieces are more concerned with facts than theory. Still, anyone who isn't working on a Ph.D. in film theory should wait until a stronger writer comes along to make better use of the excellent appendices that *Hollywood's White House* contains.

-Matthew Continetti



Liberation's Children: Parents and Kids in a Postmodern Age by Kay S. Hymowitz (Ivan R. Dee, 202 pp., \$24.95). There's a

new breed of children out there. And they have, in the words of Kay

Hymowitz, "unprecedented opportunities to realize their talents and tastes." They're liberation's children, and they're growing up in a neighborhood near you.

Hymowitz, author of the 1999 Ready or Not: Why Treating Children as Small Adults Endangers Their Future—and Ours, continues her exploration of child-rearing in Liberation's Children: Parents and Kids in a Postmodern Age. The book contains eleven essays, written over the last seven years, that outline how children are suffering from a moral void brought on by parents who, instead of guiding their children morally and spiritually, are preparing them only for society's "meritocratic struggle for success."

The moral instruction of today's children has been replaced with the instruction afforded by "Baby Mozart" CDs, foreign-language tapes, even computer software for infants, Hymowitz declares. Suddenly, getting their four-year-old into an elite "Baby Ivy" elementary school has become more important to parents than teaching manners and self-control. It's no wonder school discipline is dead and that "tweens"-kids between eight and twelve who lean toward troubling teen behavior—are ubiquitous. With morals and selfrestraint taking a backseat to child empowerment, Hymowitz laments that kids are dangerously free to explore their sexuality or to attend college with no real grasp of their nation's history, "now lumped with the 'useless' humanities."

How we can break the ugly cycle is a question Hymowitz has yet to answer. But in *Liberation's Children* she scrupulously points out our alltoo-familiar "obsession with individual autonomy"—which begins with the career-driven mother dropping her baby off at a "quality" day-care center and ends with that child grown into a decentered, obsessively work-driven adult.

—Erin Montgomery

"What can make a top college say <u>YES</u> to my child's admissions application?"

Introducing...

Early Advantage COLLEGE ADMISSIONS^M

A better way to play the admissions game ... and win.

There's a lot YOU can do to help your son or daughter get into one of America's top colleges. Early Advantage College AdmissionsSM is the new program that dispels the cloud of secrecy and removes the layers of anxiety surrounding the admissions process. We'll show you a better way to play the admissions game ... and win. You'll learn how to find a terrific school where your son or daughter will flourish and thrive. A first-choice school!

WE'LL SHOW YOU ...

- Fabulous colleges that you may not know about.
- · Side doors and back doors to some of America's most prestigious colleges. Harvard. Columbia. Cornell. NYU. Georgetown.
- Ways to make your student stand out even if grades and scores are not the highest.
- · Powerful allies in the admissions process so your application gets red carpet treatment.
- Lesser-known colleges that are "feeder schools" for the nation's top graduate schools.

Early Advantage College Admissions will help your son or daughter look at college in a whole new light!

Receive 5 college recommendations from our expert panel.

Our program will encourage your child to sit down, pen in hand, and quickly profile his or her likes, dislikes, goals, and aspirations, using our Personal Strategy Planning assessments.

After your student submits a profile, our panel of advisors will match that profile against our database of over 550 top colleges. We'll recommend 5 outstanding colleges - great schools - based on your child's interests, talents, personality. Since time is tight, we'll endeavor to get back to you within 96 hours.



Our Senior Advisor

Peter Temes, Ph.D. (Columbia) is Senior Advisor of Early Advantage College Admissions. Dr. Temes has taught at Harvard, Columbia, and NYU. He is currently the president of a college in New England. All materials have been personally authored or approved by Dr. Temes.

Our panel brings together academics and professionals with degrees from Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, Brown, Stanford, Michigan, and other top universities.



Preview the program. RISK-FREE!

- PERSONAL STRATEGY GUIDE, with five guidance modules so powerful, positive, and personal that your student will focus on college like never before!
- PERSONAL STRATEGY PLANNERS! Your son or daughter sits down with these five quick, personal strategy-planning tools and creates a profile. We'll match the profile with our database of hundreds of top colleges.
- THE CD ADMISSIONS COACHSM discusses the tricks and the traps when applying to college.
- 3 FREE REPORTS! How to WIN the Early Admissions Game. How to Write a Great Admissions Essay. And ... 38 Red-Hot Colleges that Ivy

Keep these 3 privately published reports just for looking!

You can only WIN!

Preview the program with your student, in your home, for up to 30 days. If not satisfied, return it for a full refund. Or keep the program, submit your student's Personal Profile at any time, and receive 5 college recommendations from our panel of experts.

Call toll-free 1-888-807-3986 to speak with one of our representatives. Or mail the coupon today. Look at the program, satisfy yourself as to its value – or receive a full refund. Keep the 3 privately published reports, whatever you decide.

RESERVATION APPLICATION EARLY ADVANTAGE

COLLEGE ADMISSIONS"

Call toll-free

Code 13-0031

1-888-807-3986

* CT residents add 6% sales tax.

or mail this coupon now.

Early Advantage College Admissions P.O. Box 4063, 270 Monroe Turnpike

All orders are subject to acceptance.

YES. We'll preview Early Advantage College Admissions for 30 days. If not satisfied, we can return the materials, for a full refund. Please charge my credit card \$34.75* a month for four months. \$8.50* shipping/handling will be added to the first installment.

The 3 privately printed reports are ours to keep free. 1.) How to Win the Early Admissions Game.

Name (Please print clearly)			
Address			
City	State	Zip	
Email address			
Credit Card 🗖 VISA 🗖 MasterCard 🗖 Amex			
Credit Card Number	Ез	Expiration Date	
Signature			

The Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice—Saudi Arabia's official religious police—warns against the threat of Barbie dolls (it calls them "Jewish Barbie dolls") in this poster found on its website (www.hesbah.gov.sa/contravention.asp?grp=3).

Not a Parody

عرانس باربي اليعودية بملابسها العارية وأوهناعها المشينة وعيناتها وأدواتها المختلفة وهي بعز للانخلال لدى الغرب المنحرف ... فلندرك خطرها ولنحذر. هذه صور لعينات بالمعرض الدائم للمخالفات الشرعية يقر هيئة المدينة ال إدارة العلاقات العامة والإعلام ت ، ۱۲۲۲۰۰ - ۱۲۲۸۲۰ (غويله) ۲۲ ، س ،

The Arabic text of the poster reads:

"A Strange Request . . .
A little girl tells her mother:
'Mommy, I want jeans,
a T-shirt, and a swimsuit
like Barbie's.'

Jewish Barbie dolls, with their revealing clothing, lewd positions, and different styles and accessories, are symbols of Western decadence and perversion. . . . Let us recognize the danger and be vigilant."

